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PREFACE
This collection of five papers constitutes the second of two volumes on Japanese agricultural
policy.
The first paper, by Masayoshi Honma, looks at agricultural policy reform in Japan from a
political economy perspective, especially in respect of the implementation of the Uruguay Round
Agreement and the next round of negotiations.
Ray Trewin then picks up the implications of East Asian approaches to food security for the
next WTO round, mainly contrasting Japan’s self-sufficiency approach with China’s more open
trade and investment policies. Regional arrangements to address food security are promoted in the
paper.
A paper by Malcolm Bosworth and Leanne Holmes develops and applies a framework for
assessing the costs and benefits of Japan’s sanitary and phytosanity (SPS) measures, especially in
respect of the WTO SPS agreement. The implication for Japan’s SPS policies are drawn out in the
paper.
Randy Stringer looks at the constraining role of land institutions and regulations, which are
similar in East Asia, on structural adjustment, especially in agriculture, and the costs and benefits
of such institutions and regulations.
The final paper, by Yoshihisa Godo, explains, for the first time in English, the reasons behind
the small size of Japanese farming that has constrained productivity, and the distortions in land
use and farm output caused by farmland use regulations and taxation. Desirable directions for
Japanese agricultural policy reform are also discussed in the paper.
It is expected that this collection of papers will assist Australian and Japanese agencies and
businesses, and those from other countries, to develop strategies for improving Japanese
agricultural policies during the upcoming WTO round.
Peter Drysdale
Executive Director, AJRC
v1
Japan’s Agricultural Policy and WTO
Negotiations
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Seikei University

List of tables .................................................................................................... vi
Introduction ....................................................................................... 1.1
The political economy of agricultural protectionism ............................. 1.1
The Uruguay Round agreement and current trade barriers .................. 1.2
Japan’s proposals for the new WTO round .......................................... 1.7
Conclusion ........................................................................................ 1.14
Notes ......................................................................................................... 1.15
References .................................................................................................. 1.16
CONTENTS
Table 1.1 Weighted averages of nominal protection rates
for agriculture, per cent ..................................................... 1.3
Table 1.2 Tariff peaks by agricultural product groups (EC,
Japan and the US) ............................................................. 1.5
Table 1.3 Average tariff rates applied to agricultural imports,
selected countries. .............................................................. 1.6
Table 1.4 The levels of Aggregate Measurement of Support
(AMS) for selected countries. ............................................. 1.7
Table 1.5 Comparison of commitments of agricultural
importers and exporters ................................................... 1.13
TABLES
JAPAN’S AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND WTO NEGOTIATIONS
Introduction
Although the Uruguay Round was very successful in negotiating the Agreement on Agriculture
and bringing agriculture into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), many barriers and
distortions still exist in agricultural trade.
While agriculture’s share of both GDP and the labour force diminishes as economies
develop, the sector becomes more powerful in achieving protection. This paper discusses how
the political economy of agriculture has influenced Japan’s agricultural policies. It looks at
how Japan has implemented the Agriculture Agreement and discusses its proposals for the
second stage of multilateral agricultural reform, which started in March this year. Finally,
it examines the future for Japanese agriculture in a more open trading system.
The political economy of agricultural protectionism
In 1997 Japan had 3.34 million farm households, with 3.15 million workers engaged mainly
in agricultural activities. Agricultural production created farm-gate sales of 11 trillion yen
and value-added of 6 trillion yen. Agriculture’s importance is declining: the sector contributed
just 1.2 per cent of GDP and employed only 4.8 per cent of the labour force in 1997. The number
of workers engaged mainly in agriculture is less than the number of farm households because
Japan has many small family farms that do not have full-time farm workers.1  Full-time farm
households in which there are no workers engaged in other employment account for only 13
per cent of total farm households. The average annual income of a farm household was 8.8
million yen in 1997, 23 per cent more than that of an average industrial worker’s household,
but on average only 14 per cent of income comes from farming.
Japan has no comparative advantage in agriculture with a sector dominated by small-
scale, land-intensive operations. But more than 3 million households are still farming because
they receive high support prices and are protected from import competition. Farmers also
enjoy preferential income tax, asset tax and inheritance tax treatment.
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Although agriculture seems to be furnished with competitive conditions, with many
producers who supply and many consumers who demand agricultural products, Japanese
farmers are politically powerful and have been able to achieve agricultural protection
regardless of the inefficiency this creates. In industrialised countries, agricultural protection
tends to increase as the sector’s contribution to the economy decreases. As incomes rise,
consumers become more tolerant of agricultural protection and although farmers are fewer,
their political power grows as the number of ‘free riders’ in lobbying decreases. Once in place,
it is difficult to break up the political equilibrium among farmers, consumers, taxpayers and
politicians.
Table 1.1 shows the nominal rates of price support for 14 countries from 1955 to 1990.
Agricultural protection in Japan is extremely high, as it is in Switzerland and Korea. In 1955
protection was about a half that of the European Community, but the use of price supports
increased rapidly in the high-growth era up until 1970. In Japan, as in Korea and Taiwan,
high economic growth widened the gap between labour productivity in agriculture and in
other sectors, and price support was used to lessen inequality and provide stability.
In Europe the difference in labour productivity between agriculture and other sectors
has not been as significant, rather it has been the declining share of agriculture and falling
agricultural incomes that have been behind agricultural protection. These factors have also
contributed to rising protection in Japan in recent years.
Both food importing and food exporting countries have used various measures to protect
agriculture to the point where the sector is now considered to be in ‘disarray’ (Johnson 1973,
1991) with the cost of agricultural protection becoming unbearable, especially for food
exporting countries. The high level of protection explains why foreign producers have become
a strong countervailing force against domestic demand for agricultural protection and why
agriculture was one of the most important areas in the Uruguay Round negotiations.
The Uruguay Round agreement and current trade barriers
The Agreement on Agriculture was successful in establishing completely new rules and
commitments in three areas: market access, domestic support and export subsidies. Because
Japan does not subsidise agricultural exports and agreed not to introduce subsidies, only the
first two areas are relevant.
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Market access
Japan converted non-tariff barriers to tariff equivalents (TEs) for 28 commodities, including
wheat, barley, milk products, starches, legumes, peanuts, konnyaku roots, cocoons, silk and
pork. The TEs apply to imports beyond the access quantities committed, which are equivalent
to the previous import prices and are based on the difference between domestic wholesale
prices and import prices in the 1986–88 period.
Rice, the most politically sensitive commodity for Japan, was initially exempted from
tariffication in return for greater access for imports, namely 4 per cent of domestic rice
consumption in 1995, rising to 8 per cent in the final year of the implementation period in
Table 1.1 Weighted averages of nominal protection rates for agriculture, per cent
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
East Asia
Japan 18 41 69 74 76 85 108 116
Korea -46  -15 -4 29 30 117 110 151
Taiwan -17 -3 -1 2 20 52 31 55
EC
  France 33 26 30 47  29  30 37  54
West Germany 35 48 55 50 39 44  40  46
Italy 47 50 66 69 38 57  72  103
Netherlands 14 21 35 41 32 27  38  26
United Kingdom 40 37 20 27  6  35  39 44
Denmark 5 3 5 17 19  25  34 44
EC average 35 37 45 52  29 38  43 54
Other European
Sweden 34 44 50 65 43 59 65 79
Switzerland 60 64 73 96 96 126 181 218
Australia 5 7 5 7 -5 -2 -7 -4
Canada 0 4 2 -5 -4 2 0 4
United States 2 1 9 11 4 0 11 3
Note: Figures are the averages of nominal rates of protection (NRP), NRP=(domestic price-border
price)/border price, for 12 commodities (rice, wheat, barley, rye, maize, oats, sugar, beef, pork,
chicken, eggs and milk) weighted by the production value at the border price.
Source: Honma (1994).
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2000. The minimum access commitment became a burden when, after three years of good
harvests, the stock of domestic rice reached 3 million tons in October 1996 but 510,000 tons
of rice had to be imported in 1997. In December 1998 the government decided to convert the
quantitative import restrictions on rice to tariffs. In April 1999 the TE was set at 351.17 yen
per kilogram, which was much higher than the mark up of 292 yen per kilogram that applied
to the minimum access imports, and no privately imported rice was expected in 1999. The aim
of tariffication was minimising rice imports rather than consistency with WTO disciplines.
Japan is not unique in imposing high tariffs on agricultural imports. Tariff peaks (tariff
rates of 20 per cent or more in agriculture) can be observed in most industrialised countries
(Table 1.2). In the European Union, Japan and the United States, tariffs are high for dairy
products, cereals (although not in the United States), sugar and processed food. About one-
quarter of imports in the EC and Japan and one-tenth of American imports attract tariffs
above 20 per cent.
In examining levels of protection, it is necessary to also look at the level of tariff rate
quotas (TRQs) applied when non-tariff barriers such as import quotas are converted to tariffs.
Lower tariffs apply to a imports within quotas calculated from the base period (1986–88)
average, while secondary tariffs are set as TEs at very high levels. If TEs are prohibitively high
and there are no imports beyond the TRQ, there are no changes in import levels. Table 1.3
shows that Japan, Canada, Norway and Korea have applied extremely high secondary tariffs
to newly tariffied products, while Norway has high tariffs even within the TRQs. These high
secondary tariffs mean that market access for these commodities has changed little.
In Japan state trading enterprises have suppressed private imports. Rice, wheat and
barley imports are controlled by the Food Agency, and skim milk, butter and raw silk imports
are controlled by the Agriculture and Livestock Industry Corporation (ALIC). Although under
tariffication anyone can import if the TE is paid, little has been privately imported. The state
trading enterprise can expand imports if demand increases and charges a marked-up price
that is less than the TE, so private users of these commodities buy from the state trading
enterprises at a lower cost. The import quantities of wheat and barley were increased after
tariffication in 1995, but these products continued to be mainly imported by the Food Agency.
Domestic support
The Agreement on Agriculture sets rules for reducing domestic agricultural support policies.
Domestic support policies were divided into three boxes – amber, blue and green – depending
1.5
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Table 1.2 Tariff peaks by agricultural product groups (EC, Japan and the US)
Product group Number of tariff lines within a tariff No. of Share in
                    range peaks  total %
Total 20-29 % 30-99 % >100 %
European Community (EC)
Meat, live animals (1–2) 351 68 79 14 161 46
Fish and crustaceans (3) 373 45 0 0 45 12
Dairy products (4)197 21 77 9 107 54
Fruit and vegetables (7–8) 407 10 5 1 16 4
Cereals, flours etc. (10–11) 174 29 75 0 104 60
Veg. oils, fats, oilseeds (12, 15) 211 0 8 2 10 5
Canned & prep. meat, fish (16) 10,517 8 0 25 24
Sugar, cocoa & prep. (17, 18) 75 34 6 0 40 53
Prepared fruit, vegetables (20) 310 70 39 1 110 35
Other food ind. products (19, 21) 90 27 8 0 35 39
Beverages & tobacco (22, 24) 2029 15 2 26 13
Other agr. products (5–6, 13–14, 23) 231 4 14 4 22 10
All agr., fish. products (1–24) 2,726 343 334 33 701 26
Japan
Meat, live animals (1–2) 136 3 19 7 29 21
Fish and crustaceans (3) 189 0 0 0 0 0
Dairy products (4) 146 45 57 22 122 84
Fruit and vegetables (7–8) 209 1 2 7 10 5
Cereals, flours etc. (10–11) 132 37 24 10 71 54
Veg. oils, fats, oilseeds (12, 15) 161 1 1 3 5 3
Canned & prep. meat, fish (16) 101 21 3 3 27 27
Sugar, cocoa & prep. (17,18) 80 26 19 6 51 64
Prepared fruit, vegetables (20) 231 52 5 2 59 26
Other food ind. products (19, 21) 232 113 2 15 130 56
Beverages & tobacco (22, 24) 65 8 0 0 8 12
Other agr. prod (5–6, 13–14, 23) 65 0 0 0 0 0
All agr., fish. products (1–24) 1,890 307 132 75 514 27
United States
Meat, live animals (1–2) 116 6 0 0 6 5
Fish and crustaceans (3) 114 0 0 0 0 0
Dairy products (4) 251 29 58 9 96 38
Fruit and vegetables (7–8) 269 13 0 0 13 5
Cereals, flours etc. (10–11) 59 0 0 0 0 0
Veg.oils, fats, oilseeds (12, 15) 124 0 2 2 4 3
Canned & prep. meat, fish (16) 90 1 1 0 2 2
Sugar, cocoa & prep. (17, 18) 144 6 13 2 21 15
Prepared fruit, vegetables (20) 169 3 2 3 8 5
Other food ind. products (19, 21) 156 11 18 2 31 20
Beverages & tobacco (22, 24) 126 1 3 8 12 10
Other agr. products (5–6, 13–14, 23) 161 0 2 0 2 1
All agr., fish. products (1–24) 1,779 70 99 26 195 11
Notes: Tariff peaks are defined as tariff rates of 20 per cent or more; all are MFN tariffs; SITC numbers
are within the parentheses.
Source: FAO based on data from UNCTAD/WTO (1997) The post-UR tariff environment for developing
countries, TD/B/COM.1/14, Tables 1–3.
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on the effects on production and trade. Non-trade distorting policies have been put into the green
box and have been exempted from reduction. Further exemptions fall into the blue box, including
the use by the United States and the European Union of direct payments based on fixed area
and yield. All other trade-distorting support policies were put in the amber box. Industrialised
countries have committed to reduce the total value of these policies (as measured by the
Aggregate Measurement of Support) by 20 per cent during the implementation period (1995–
2000). Table 1.4 shows selected countries’ AMS levels in the base period (1986–88), current
values and commitments for 2000. Price supports (calculated as total production multiplied by
the difference between domestic and international prices for all commodities) make up most of
the value of the AMS. Other government expenditures that stimulate domestic production and
therefore have effects on trade make up the remainder.
All the countries in the table have bettered the committed reduction of 20 per cent, but
the United States, Australia and Canada have achieved the largest reductions, with falls of
74, 78 and 86 per cent, respectively. Japan, the EU and Korea achieved much lesser reductions
of 36, 37 and 31 per cent, respectively. Exporting countries such as the United States,
Australia and Canada are therefore likely to demand that other countries reduce the AMS by
much more.
Table 1.3 Average tariff rates applied to agricultural imports, selected countries.
All agricultural               Newly tariffied products All
products
products Within TRQ Secondary
Japan 12 20 274 5
United States 6 10 29 4
European Union 20 8 45 7
Canada 5 8 203 5
Australia 3 7 27 10
Switzerland 51 36 81 9
Norway 124 216 239 26
Korea 62 21 366 18
Thailand 35 31 91 29
Source: OECD, Review of Tariffs Synthesis Report, 1999.
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Table 1.4 The levels of Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) for selected
countries.
AMS in base Committed Current AMS
period  level of AMS % of price
in 2000 support
Japan (billion yen)  4,966 3,973 3,171 94 %
United States (million US$) 23,879 19,103 6,238 93 %
European Union (million ECU) 80,975 67,159  51,009 96 %
Australia (million A$) 590  472 132 0 %
Canada (million C$)  5,376  4,301 777  73 %
Korea (billion won) 2,260  1,798  1,563  100 %
Note: Current AMS are 1977 figures for Japan, the United States and Australia, 1996 figures for the
European Union, 1995 figures for Canada and 1998 figures for Korea.
Source: MAFF, ‘WTO nogyo koushou no kadai to ronten’ (Issues and Points of WTO Negotiations on
Agriculture), May 2000.
Rising domestic reform of agricultural policies has contributed to the success in reducing the
AMS, but a number of questions remain. Do the policies categorised in the green box really
have no effects of production and trade? Is it necessary to make exemptions for the blue box
policies? And does reduction at an aggregate level effectively reduce barriers to trade? Some
countries believe that the AMS should be reduced on a product-specific basis if the presently
high protection of sensitive products is to be brought down,2  and if transparency and
predictability are to be achieved in commodity markets.
Japan’s proposals for the new WTO round
Although the Ministerial Conference in Seattle last December failed to launch a new WTO
round, agricultural negotiations have a built-in agenda. Negotiations on agricultural reform
started in March 2000 and each county is to submit proposals for reforms by December 2000.
Most countries had already submitted proposals for the Seattle conference and the submis-
sions are likely to be similar. Therefore, this paper examines Japan’s 1999 submission,
compares this with those of other countries and discusses the possibility of Japan’s proposals
being accepted in the forthcoming negotiations.
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Japan submitted its proposal on agricultural negotiations to the WTO in June 1999
(MAFF 1999a) and later presented a supplementary paper (MAFF 1999b). Japan’s proposal
states that the following three points should be included in the rules and disciplines of the
forthcoming agricultural negotiations: the importance of the multifunctionality of agricul-
ture, the importance of food security, and the need for impartiality in importing and
exporting.3
Multifunctionality of agriculture
Japan regards the multifunctionality of agriculture as an important aspect of ‘non-trade
concerns’ that Article 20 of WTO Agreement of Agriculture provides can be taken into account
in negotiations. Japan argues that some trade barriers are necessary to prevent the loss of
multifunctional benefits that would occur if domestic production was to fall. However, Article
20 also provides that negotiations will be initiated with the recognition that ‘the long-term
objective of substantial progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in
fundamental reform is an ongoing process’. Policy measures to support the multifunctionality
of agriculture may therefore conflict with long-term objectives for agricultural liberalisation.
Japan believes agriculture adds value to society by: conserving land and helping to
prevent floods, soil erosion and landslides; fostering water resources; preserving the natural
environment by aiding the management of organic waste, the resolution and removal of
polluted substances, air purification and the maintenance of bio-diversity and the preserva-
tion of wildlife habitats; preserving the scenic landscape; transmitting culture; providing
rural amenities; maintaining and revitalising the rural community; and improving food
security (MAFF 1999c).
Identifying the multifunctional benefits that agriculture provides is an important part
of evaluating agricultural activities, but it is also important to consider the costs of the
agricultural operations that provide these benefits. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries (MAFF) used a substitutive cost method to estimate the value of paddy fields and
upland fields at 4.6 trillion yen and 2.0 trillion yen, respectively (MAFF 1999d).4
A fundamental variable for assessing the multifunctionality of agriculture and for
choosing agricultural policy measures is not the total value of the benefits provided but the
marginal loss (gain) as agricultural production shrinks (expands). In other words, the social
demand curves for these functions and how they relate to agricultural production are needed
1.9
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to find the optimal level of domestic production that maximises the social net benefit of these
externalities. For example, we need to know how much social value has been lost by the
diversion programs for paddy fields, how the minimum access arrangements for rice have
damaged the environment, and so on. While such estimations are difficult, they are necessary
if Japan wishes to place multifunctionality at the centre of its proposals for the WTO
negotiations.
The negotiations will discuss levels of support and protection that affect trade and
production. Japan’s proposal states that multifunctionality can be examined under the
following conditions: where functions are closely related to, and cannot be separated from,
agricultural production; where functions play an important role in relation to the agricultural
production activities that have generally been observed; and where the value of their function
is commonly recognised by the people of the country concerned. A quantitative assessment of
multifunctionality in terms of agricultural production is necessary because there are many
levels of agricultural production and many combinations of products that can achieve a
certain social value. In addition, farming does not necessary aim to achieve multifunctional
goals and may not be the best way of fulfilling social needs. For example, although paddy fields
retain water and help prevent floods, the primary aim of water control is growing rice and
methods of water control are not necessarily efficient in preventing floods. Paddy fields
provide a habitat for a variety of flora and fauna but at the same time the chemicals and
pesticides used in agricultural activities put these at risk. These complex and ambiguous
effects make it difficult to make quantitative assessments and gather scientific evidence of
multifunctionality.
Japan’s policies are likely to be constrained by the views of other countries. Agricultural
exporters may request that Japan give quantitative evidence of the relationship between
production and the value of externalities, or that it seek alternative farming methods to
maintain multifunctionality. It is unlikely that agricultural exporters will believe that lost
export opportunities are a worthwhile sacrifice to meet Japan’s domestic goals. Food
exporters could also employ a multifunctionality argument by insisting that because they
produce more than they eat, they need to export to maintain the multifunctionality of
agriculture. Japan would find it hard to deny such an argument.
Furthermore, Japan will have to choose policy measures that are consistent with WTO
disciplines. The goals of multifunctionality and food security do not seem to provide a strong
basis for the coexistence internationally of various types of agriculture. Variety in production
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is best achieved through the dynamics of competition and comparative advantage. It would be
more appropriate to make multifunctionality a green or blue box policy of direct support, as
Switzerland mentions in its proposal of 20 July 1999.5
Food security
Japan considers food security to be one of agriculture’s multifunctional benefits, but this is
misleading as food security is not an externality created through agricultural activity and
therefore it is best to deal with this goal separately. The Food and Agriculture Organisation
defines food security as a situation in which all households have both physical and economic
access to adequate food for all members and where households are not at risk of losing such
access. Countries can achieve food security by follow ing a policy of food self-sufficiency or one
of food self-reliance. Food self-sufficiency means meeting food needs as far as possible from
domestic supplies and minimising food imports. With a policy of food self-reliance, a level of
domestic production is maintained but international trade is also relied on to meet the food
needs of the population. The appropriate strategy to follow will depend on the perception of
the benefits and risks of relying on international trade.
Food security is an important issue for countries with low food self-sufficiency ratios.
Japan produces 40 per cent of its calorie requirements – the lowest ratio among the
industrialised countries – and this is of concern to many. Food security is one of the basic roles
that the government should play. MAFF has set a target of 45 per cent for the food self-
sufficiency ratio and is encouraging public effort to meet this goal by 2010.
Japan states in its WTO proposal that it will rely on domestic production, food stockpiles
and imports to achieve food security. However, it says an excessive dependence on imports
should be avoided for the following reasons: world food supplies may become unstable in the
short term and may become tighter in the medium to long term; agricultural trade has such
unstable features because relatively low portions of output are currently being exported and
the major agricultural products are only being exported by some specific countries; and large
purchases by an economically dominant country at a time of food shortage may have a negative
impact on the international market.6  Stockpiling is seen as only a short-term solution to food
shortages because of losses in quality and the cost of storing food.
Policy measures need to address the risks for food security at minimum social cost.7  The
predictions for world market conditions depend on the assumptions and forecasts of
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exogenous variables. It should also be realised that volatility is increased by interventions to
protect domestic markets. If domestic markets are integrated, poor or rich harvests in some
areas can be easily absorbed into the world market, providing a better way of achieving food
security than restrictions on trade aimed at boosting domestic production.
The Japanese government could draw up a blueprint for action similar to a national
security plan to address unpredictable emergencies that threaten food security. MAFF
estimated that in 2010 Japan could provide 1,890 to 2,030 calories of food a day for each person
by solely relying on domestic resources, which is similar to the calorie intake of the early 1950s
(although consumption differed from today’s diet).8  However, there is no emergency plan for
shifting operations to get food supplies to the public. An emergency system would be less costly
to consumers and taxpayers than trying to increase the food self-sufficiency ratio at time when
world supplies are plentiful.
Japan is not alone in emphasising the importance of food security. Although many
countries argue that food security should be considered in the forthcoming negotiations, their
stances are a little different from Japan’s. A communication of 15 October 1999 from Cuba,
the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Uganda and Zimbabwe
saw food security as being a problem of small-scale farming: ‘food security is certainly being
put in jeopardy as it leaves small farmers which have been pushed out without the necessary
financial resources to procure the food they need for their subsistence, even though food may
be available on the world markets’. And although not directly referring to food security, a
communication from Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand on 23 September 1999
made a similar statement: ‘The agricultural sector in developing countries is characterised
by the predominance of small farm holdings, where farming provides a major, if not the sole,
source of livelihood for a large portion of the population’.
In developing countries, food security is more a problem of a lack of income than
production. If gains from trade raise incomes, especially those of farmers, food security can
be achieved through a balanced combination of domestic production and international trade.
If industrialised countries such as Japan wish to use protection to boost production and
improve food security, this will be opposed by other countries. In addition, Japan’s current
diet can not be maintained without imports. Food security is best achieved by diversifying
import sources and building international cooperation for securing trade and development.
1.12
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Strengthening export rules
The third point of Japan’s proposal is the need to address under WTO rules the imbalance in
rights and obligations between exporting and importing countries. Japan believes the
Agricultural Agreement is much stricter on importers than exporters. For example, only a
prior consultation obligation has been established concerning export prohibitions and
restrictions (Article 12) and no rules have been set on reducing export taxes or comprehen-
sively binding customs restrictions. On the other hand, all quantitative restrictions have been
prohibited (Article 4-2), except for those given special treatment under Annex 5 and the
general rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Japan states:
Given the existing trade rules, which allow an exporting county to take restrictions or
prohibitions, importing countries have legitimate rights to take appropriate border meas-
ures for food security in their own country. (Paragraph 31 in Communication from Japan,
28 June 1999)
Table 1.5 describes the commitments of agricultural importers and exporters under the
current Agreement on Agriculture.
The proposals of exporting countries such as the United States and the European Union
mention the need for greater transparency in export behaviour, although they do not directly
call for the strengthening of export rules. In the Cairns Group Vision Statement, Australia
called for the disciplining of export restrictions. It said: ‘Export restrictions must not be
allowed to disrupt the supply of food to world markets, in particular to net-food importing
countries’.9  The Cairns Group insists all trade barriers should be targeted for liberalisation,
putting agricultural trade on the same basis as trade in other goods. Tighter disciplines on
export restrictions and taxes would be part of this approach.
Japan’s call for impartial rules for importing and exporting countries is consistent with
the objectives of the Agreement on Agriculture, and if export rules were strengthened this
would help alleviate Japan’s concerns about food security. However, Japan may have to accept
that multifunctionality could also apply to exporting countries. In reality Japan’s aims do not
seem to be about achieving freer trade. By asserting that because of the impartiality of the
current rules, importers should have the right to impose border measures, its proposal does
little to eliminate barriers on either side.
1.13
No. 305 July 2000
Table 1.5 Comparison of commitments of agricultural importers and exporters
 Importer Exporter
I. Customs 
(1) Concessions Import customs for all agricultural Export taxes are not in the concession
products. schedule.
(2) Tariff reduction rate Promise to reduce by 36% on average No reduction obligation.
tariffs on all agricultural products
(and by a minimum of 15% for
individual products).
(3) Safeguard measures Customs can be raised by no more No prohibitions (since export taxes
than a third of the usual level to are not listed in the schedule, taxes
alleviate drastic change at a time of can be freely set or raised).
a large increase in imports for a
tarrified product (special safeguard).
II. Export/import restrictions 
(1) Numerical restrictions In principle implement tariffication Export restrictions/prohibitions can
of non-tariff measures such as be established or continued, on the
restrictions on import volumes. condition that they consider the
impact on the food security of im-
porters and that the establishment
of export prohibitions/restrictions is
notified in advance or importers are
consulted with if required.
(2)Provision of access Set minimum access levels for No provisions.
opportunity products that make up less than 5%
of domestic consumption in the
standard period (1986–88).
Reduction in 1st year (1995)=3% to
5% by 6th year (2000).
III. Export subsidies 
    Export subsidies allowed on
agricultural products or product
groups in the standard period. Should
reduce by 36% in cost and 21% in
volume.
Flexibility is allowed, for example
rollover to the following year.
Source: MAFF, ‘Export regulations in the existing agreement (Reference No. 4)’, June 1999.
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Conclusion
If Japanese agriculture is to be viable under a more open trading system, productivity needs to
improve, particularly relative to the European Union countries. The expansion of the scale of
farm operations is crucial. Farmers have held onto land with expectations of huge capital gains
when the opportunity arises to convert it to non-agricultural uses. Land leasing provides an
alternative way to expand the size of operations and therefore deregulation of the farmland
rental market is essential.
Even if the size of farm operations did increase, it does not necessarily mean that Japanese
agriculture will become internationally competitive. Japan may never be able to compete with
countries such as the United States and Australia in wheat or feed grain production. For
Japanese agriculture to survive in an open trading system, production needs to be based on
comparative advantage and resources should shift to sectors such as horticulture and livestock
that are intensive in technology and human capital. Developments in Japanese agriculture
include the entry of non-agricultural companies in horticulture. For example, Omuron Corpora-
tion, a high-technology industrial automation company, produces tomatoes in a huge computer-
controlled glasshouse. Farm management also needs to be diversified, encouraging other types
of management such as joint-stock companies.
Japan calls the 21st century an era of ‘diversity and coexistence’ (MAFF 1999b) but
appears to be trying to achieve this aim through protection. While farming does create
multifunctional benefits, these benefits should not be used as an excuse for protection.
Multifunctionality goals should be achieved through appropriate domestic policies and not
hold up further liberalisation in agricultural trade. The new Basic Law on Food, Agriculture
and Rural Areas contains areas for domestic reform and deregulation and these are urgent
to achieve the diversity and coexistence of agriculture.
The commitments in the Agreement on Agriculture for improving market access and
dismantling domestic support and export subsidies provide for substantial progressive
reductions in support and protection, and upcoming negotiations are aimed at continuing this
process. Although most countries have fully implemented their commitments under the
Agricultural Agreement, obstacles to agricultural trade still exist and the volume of trade has
not increased substantially. Tariffication was introduced to improve market access but tariff
equivalents have been prohibitively high for many commodities, limiting imports in a similar
way to the previous import quotas. The commitments on reducing domestic support have not
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been enough to correct the distortions. Some items in the green box are still tied to production.
Some countries still subsidise exports, and there are no disciplines on export credits, which
play the same role as export subsidies.
Japan depends a great deal on imports for its food needs and has benefited much from
international trade. In negotiations for further reductions in support and protection, what
role should it take? Non-trade concerns will be important. Indeed, Japan’s proposal on
multifunctionality is supported by the European Union, Switzerland, Norway and Korea, and
the importance of food security is recognised by Switzerland, Korea, India, Bangladesh and
Venezuela. Korea has also lobbied to strengthen export rules.10  But Japan should not be using
these non-trade concerns as an excuse to maintain border measures to protect farmers.
A compromise is needed between trade and non-trade concerns. Subsidies for agricul-
tural activities may provide a better way of meeting multifunctionality goals. However, if
subsidies increase production, they will come within the amber box and will impose costs
domestically in terms of losses in benefits from trade. Subsidies that are targeted to the
particular agricultural activities that create the externalities, similar to the direct payments
that Japan introduced for disadvantaged areas, are more suitable policies than the wide-
spread protection of farming.
Notes
1 Japan’s Agricultural Census defines a farm household as one that operates on 10 ares
(1 are = 1/100 hectare) or more of farmland, or annual sales of agricultural products
of 150,000 yen or more.
2 See, for example, the proposal prepared for the WTO 1999 Ministerial Conference by
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Honduras, Sri Lanka, Uganda
and Zimbabwe, although it insists that for developing countries the aggregate AMS
should be applied.
3 Japan’s proposal also mentions two other points: the need for special consideration
for developing countries and its response to new challenges such as GMOs (geneti-
cally modified organisms).
4 For a review of studies in this area see Demura and Yoshida (1999). There are other
estimates of agricultural externalities using different methods including travel cost,
contingent valuation and hedonic methods. There are criticisms of the methods, ways
of calculation and data used to evaluate the value of multifunctionality. See, for
example, ABARE (1999) and Trewin (2000).
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5 Although not mentioning the blue box, Switzerland’s proposal says, ‘solutions should
be found … in particular by extending the measures allowed under Annex 2 to the
Agreement on Agriculture’ (the green box).
6 Paragraph 18 in MAFF (1999a).
7 For example, Hayami (1988) classified possible food crises and proposed appropriate
policy measures.
8 See MAFF’s Web site at <http://www.kanbou.maff.go.jp/anpo/>.
9 Communication from Australia of 6 July 1999.
10 Information issued by MAFF as of September 1999.
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EAST ASIAN APPROACHES TO FOOD SECURITY AND SOME
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NEXT WTO ROUND
Introduction
East Asia is made up of a diverse group of countries of various sizes and at different stages
of development. However, all nations are densely populated, and therefore food security has
long been a policy priority in East Asia.
What is meant by food security? The Food and Agricultural Organisation’s definition is
‘adequate and stable supplies of appropriate food to all’, which implies that prices are
reasonable1  (FAO 1996). In Japan, food security is taken mainly to mean food self-sufficiency,
especially in staple foods such as rice. In contrast, China addresses food security with a more
open trade and investment approach. It imports some raw commodities and pays for these
with exports, including exports of processed foods derived from these commodities, building
on its comparative advantage in labour-intensive activities. Whether a country should
address its food security needs through attempting to be self-sufficient in food, by trading
based on comparative advantage, or through some middle position will depend on a number
of factors and is a question that economic modelling can help answer. East Asian approaches
to food security significantly impact on their own economies and also have implications for
world markets.
This paper examines the importance of agriculture in East Asia. It looks at production,
consumption and trade trends as a guide to the determinants and implications of food security
policies. The focus is on the contrasting approaches of China and Japan – two large economies
representative of different stages of development and different political systems. A general
equilibrium global trade model is used to quantify the implications of alternative approaches
to food security. The paper examines intermediate approaches to food security – for instance
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum’s recent endorsement of a comprehen-
sive and balanced policy package that is designed to promote a regional approach to greater
food security (PECC 1999). Regional arrangements are discussed in light of the upcoming
World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations on agricultural trade.
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Explaining different food security approaches
A number of different factors influence the approach countries are likely to take to food
security. Basic resource endowments are a key determinant of whether an economy can
efficiently follow a food self-sufficiency approach. The ratio of arable land per head of
population varies considerably in East Asia. Singapore, Hong Kong and Brunei clearly can
not rely on domestic production to feed their people and must import food (Table 2.1). Japan’s
arable land has decreased markedly. In China, arable land is approximately 30 times that of
Japan and has increased slightly, but its population is nearly 10 times higher than Japan’s,
and has been rising faster. Thailand’s arable land per head of population is around three times
that of China.
Agriculture in East Asia has been declining in importance as economies develop (Table
2.2). Taking Japan and China as examples, per capita GDP is about 40 times higher in Japan
than in China, but agriculture’s share of GDP is 10 times higher in China, although this has
been declining rapidly as the economy grows and manufacturing and services sectors develop.
Table 2.1 Population and arable land of selected East Asian economies
                                 Population (millions)                         Arable land (million hectares)
1990 1997 1990 1996
Brunei 0.26 0.31 0.00 0.00
Cambodia 8.65  10.48 3.70 3.72
China 1,135.20 1,227.20 123.68 124.16
Hong Kong 5.70 6.50 0.01 0.01
Indonesia 178.23 200.39 20.25 17.94
Japan 123.54 126.09 4.12 3.94
Korea 42.87 45.99 1.70 1.70
Laos 4.03 4.85 0.81 0.80
Macau 0.37 0.45 na na
Malaysia 18.20 21.67 1.70 1.82
Philippines 62.60 73.53 4.83 5.22
Singapore 2.71 3.10 0.00 0.00
Taiwan na na na na
Thailand 55.60 60.60 17.49 17.09
Vietnam 66.23 76.71 5.34 5.51
Note: na = not available.
Source: United Nations, World Development Indicators
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Exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables also influence the decision to import food
rather than produce domestically; for instance, Japan’s appreciating currency has given it
greater purchasing power. These variables have been estimated to have a larger impact on
the agricultural sector than direct agricultural policies (Schiff and Valdes 1998).
Again, looking at Japan and China, we can see how agricultural production changes as
countries develop. Per capita consumption of rice in China is much greater than in Japan,
where consumption has shifted to meat and dairy products (Table 2.3).2  China produces more
rice, but Japan produces more rice per hectare of arable land. It would be expected that
because Japanese rice consumption has dropped, rice production would have also declined.
However, higher incomes have given Japan the ability to assist rice production. Self-
sufficiency ratios can be determined from the ratio of domestic consumption to production and
are also reflected in the net trade situation. For both countries, rice trade is relatively small
although China is a more consistent exporter and Japan has on occasions had high imports.
Japan’s imports reflect the importance of rice in Japan and its ability to pay for imports (an
Table 2.2 GDP per capita and agriculture’s share of GDP of selected East Asian
economies
                               GDP per capita (US$)                              Agriculture’s share of GDP
1990 1998 1990 1997
Brunei 14,000 15,414 2.4 na
Cambodia 167 251 55.7 51.1
China 332 773 27.1 18.7
Hong Kong 13,130 24,829 0.3 na
Indonesia 638 461 19.4 16.0
Japan 24,053 30,046 2.5 2.0
Korea 5,917 6,908 8.7 5.7
Laos 206 241 61.2 52.1
Macau 11,178 15,898 na na
Malaysia 2,409 3,358 18.7 12.1
hilippines 721 866 21.9 18.7
Singapore 12,401 21,807 0.3 0.1
Taiwan 7,851 11,938 na na
Thailand 1,528 1,819 12.5 11.2
Vietnam na 348 37.5 26.2
Note: na = not available.
Source: United Nations, World Development Indicators.
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indication that real food security is dependent on income). Imports may also reflect Japanese
commitments in the Uruguay Round.
Per capita consumption of wheat has been increasing in both countries, but to a greater
extent in China, while production is larger in China, both in absolute terms and relative to
its arable land. Wheat production has been increasing in China, but decreasing in Japan. Both
countries are significant importers, particularly Japan.
Meat consumption per capita is about the same in both countries and has been
increasing.3  Production is larger in China, although not relative to its arable land, and has
been increasing, while meat production in Japan has been decreasing. Japan imports a
significant and increasing amount of its meat. China is predominantly an exporter of meat,
although exports are small relative to its production and consumption.
Japan’s per capita consumption of dairy products is about 10 times higher than China’s
but seems to be tapering off, while China’s consumption is now increasing rapidly. Production
has followed a similar pattern. Both countries have increased imports of dairy products.
The consumption of sweeteners is highly correlated with the consumption of processed
foods. Per capita consumption of sweeteners is much higher in Japan than in China, but
Japan’s consumption has fallen slightly while China’s has risen rapidly with development.
Japan produces more of these products relative to its area of arable land, but production has
fallen. Japan’s trade has been fairly steady. China’s production of sweeteners has been rising
rapidly. Imports are now starting to dominate exports, but trade has been variable because
of large variations in production and stocks.
Per capita consumption of fish is much larger in Japan than China, but fish consumption
has been increasing rapidly in China, as has production, whereas Japan’s production has
fallen rapidly. Both countries are net importers, although China’s exports have increased.
The production of poultry and eggs requires little land and is often dominated by large
factory-like operations, so it can be expected that Japanese production would not be at much
of a disadvantage relative to other countries. This is reflected in low protection and prices
close to world prices. Japanese poultry production has fallen and imports have risen,
reflecting Japanese investment in countries such as China and Thailand. Consumption of
poultry and eggs has increased in Japan, while both consumption and production have risen
in China.
As economic development advances, the consumption and production of processed foods
usually increases and agriculture achieves a more complex and integrated relationship with
2.9
No. 305 July 2000
Table 2.3 Production, consumption and trade in China and Japan of key
products (1989–97) (‘000mt)
                China                 Japan
Product Year Produce Import Export Consume Produce Import Export Consume
Rice 1989 121,701 1,203 409 105,807 8,627 18 - 7,982
1990 127,790 66 431 108,186 8,754 19 - 7,968
1991 123,831 151 869 110,553 8,007 19 - 7,983
1992 125,567 117 1,085 111,823 8,815 21 - 7,990
1993 119,919 105 1,525 111,720 6,532 102 - 7,952
1994 118,747 516 1,561 110,028 9,989 2,186 - 7,630
1995 124,952 1,642 260 111,653 8,961 27 11 7,838
1996 131,448 779 368 113,918 8,624 396 - 7,793
1997 135,273 375 1,032 114,744 8,358 523 33 7,749
Wheat 1989 90,810 15,989 100 91,840 984 5,669 410 5,381
1990 98,232 13,536 105 93,708 952 5,558 434 5,468
1991 95,954 13,478 156 95,536 759 5,781 419 5,486
1992 101,591 11,688 290 96,750 759 6,071 412 5,449
1993 106,395 7,423 520 98,831 638 5,915 450 5,593
1994 99,301 8,417 527 97,447 565 6,474 426 5,907
1995 102,211 12,751 521 97,375 444 6,107 441 5,847
1996 110,569 9,352 972 103,830 478 6,081 407 5,921
1997 123,290 3,035 899 106,975 573 6,476 307 5,871
Meat 1989 27,800 117 579 27,319 3,571 1,262 10 4,680
1990 30,073 131 745 29,438 3,503 1,293 12 4,691
1991 33,055 166 971 32,228 3,422 1,411 14 4,752
1992 35,970 160 641 35,473 3,399 1,621 12 4,926
1993 40,133 182 787 39,506 3,361 1,718 10 4,978
1994 44,315 233 915 43,606 3,259 1,897 7 5,043
1995 47,853 368 1,154 47,062 3,202 2,505 7 5,578
1996 47,967 426 1,138 47,240 3,101 2,673 7 5,618
1997 53,308 335 825 52,829 3,105 2,321 6 5,317
Sweetners 1989 7,081 1,634 611 8,413 2,288 2,166 13 4,354
1990 8,129 1,198 757 9,150 2,214 1,988 14 4,212
1991 9,827 1,128 516 9,851 2,245 2,099 16 4,220
1992 9,713 1,225 1,999 8,840 2,102 2,087 14 4,076
1993 7,770 609 2,207 6,779 2,135 1,965 13 4,007
1994 7,164 1,707 1,225 7,562 2,080 1,917 13 4,081
1995 8,001 3,169 717 8,741 2,170 2,031 12 4,052
1996 8,476 1,467 910 9,803 1,956 1,912 18 3,970
1997 9,053 1,063 567 10,293 2,133 1,948 25 3,966
Milk 1989 6,581 772 38 6,145 8,059 2,223 4 8,070
1990 7,035 875 29 6,681 8,189 2,002 1 8,076
1991 7,602 983 31 7,276 8,259 2,447 1 8,309
1992 8,071 883 49 7,582 8,576 2,307 1 8,335
1993 8,150 938 76 7,633 8,626 2,108 1 8,405
1994 8,681 1,211 72 8,427 8,389 2,249 6 8,505
1995 9,457 1,079 146 9,008 8,382 2,520 12 8,567
1996 10,191 932 78 9,584 8,657 2,198 11 8,582
1997 10,757 1,048 150 10,179 8,645 2,213 13 8,545
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Table 2.3 (Continued)
             China            Japan
Product Year Produce Import Export Consume Produce Import Export Consume
Fish 1989 13,536 4,845 920 12,299 11,058 3,482 1,504 8,876
1990 14,542 3,746 1,043 13,024 10,251 3,983 1,054 8,798
1991 15,464 5,627 1,046 14,127 9,197 4,582 906 8,306
1992 17,663 5,808 1,301 16,393 8,348 4,923 587 8,281
1993 20,983 5,417 1,512 19,587 7,972 5,014 544 8,487
1994 24,962 6,549 1,720 23,352 7,273 5,552 373 8,907
1995 29,515 6,539 1,857 27,514 6,629 6,586 291 8,901
1996 32,866 7,060 1,957 30,604 6,629 6,586 291 8,901
1997 32,866 7,060 1,957 30,604 6,629 6,586 291 8,901
Poultry 1989 3285 49 46 3284 1423 296 6 1679
1990 3635 68 51 3650 1391 315 7 1665
1991 4380 86 63 4403 1357 383 9 1697
1992 5031 78 103 5004 1365 437 8 1759
1993 6321 100 120 6299 1318 436 6 1714
1994 7104 137 199 7037 1256 504 3 1723
1995 8610 264 306 8566 1267 629 3 1857
1996 9004 319 389 8931 1270 657 3 1888
1997 10796 216 387 10661 1280 623 3 1865
Eggs 1989 7413  3 45 6689 2421 28 0 2316
1990 8172  3 42 7385 2419 29 0 2317
1991 9458 2 42 8555 2498 42 0 2409
1992 10459 5 44 9466 2571 29 0 2469
1993 12070 2 32 10918 2598 32 0 2500
1994 15077 2 35 13680 2569 35 0 2478
1995 17083 2 29 15497 2551 40 0 2466
1996 19886 1 41 18076 2573 42 0 2491
1997 21640 1 83 19583 2567 41 0 2483
Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation.
manufacturing and services sectors (Holt and Pryor 1999). Inputs become more diverse, away
from labour and into capital-intensive technologies and the like. And although agriculture’s
share of GDP declines, agribusiness remains a significant component of the economy.
Forecasts from international agencies such as the FAO, the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the International Food Policy Research Institute and the
World Bank support many of these trends. There is expected to be a continuing but slowing
growth in food production worldwide, a growth in overall food consumption, especially of
livestock products, and increasing trade, but no significant increase in real prices.
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Analysis of investment trends would also help shed light on food security approaches,
but detailed information is not readily available. Generally though, as economies develop,
investment in agrifood grows. Worldwide, this investment has been increasing more rapidly
than agrifood trade (Henneberry 1995).
The efficiency of industries affects the type of food produced and therefore the approach
to food security. Compared with China, Japan has a comparative disadvantage in land- and
labour-intensive production, but it may have some comparative advantage in food production
that is capital- and technology-intensive. Export data show that China may have some
comparative advantage in labour-intensive activities such as meat production. The impact of
policies on costs and prices of agricultural products is also important to the type of food
produced and consumed.
Self-sufficiency approaches to food security
The criteria for assessing the achievement of food security objectives usually include economic
efficiency (the economic benefits versus costs), effectiveness and equity. Policies vary
depending on the number of commodities covered and whether food self-sufficiency is to be
met all the time or just for a period of time. Each approach will entail particular benefits and
costs.
Food security is particularly important in East Asia and self-sufficiency policies, which
restrict imports through tariff protection or price supports for domestic production, have been
put in place to improve food security. Japan and Korea aim for complete self-sufficiency in
staple products such as rice and as high a level of self-sufficiency as possible in other key
products. Japan uses price supports, trade constraints, state trading enterprises4  and input
and infrastructure subsidies to achieve this aim (Trewin 2000). The failure of the Great Leap
Forward to provide food security to the Chinese people illustrated the dangers of an extreme
self-sufficiency approach and China instead aims for near self-sufficiency in grains overall –
exporting some to import others. China also uses trade constraints and state agricultural
trading companies to control imports and encourage domestic production. Indonesia and
Vietnam concentrate on rice self-sufficiency and aspire for self-sufficiency in some other
commodities. Indonesia has recently introduced a more flexible approach of trend self-
sufficiency in rice in which imports in some years are balanced by exports in other years.
Malaysia and Taiwan appear recently to have opened up trade in raw materials in an attempt
to improve the overall competitiveness of the food sector.
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Trend self-sufficiency and approaches that are restricted to a few commodities
recognise to a limited degree the gains to be made from trade but are still unlikely to be the
most efficient ways of achieving food security. Self-sufficiency is only an efficient approach
to food security if a country has a comparative advantage in food production. Although any
country can achieve self-sufficiency if prices are set high enough so that domestic production
will satisfy domestic consumption, this approach comes at a huge cost. Economic costs are less
visible but just as real with the use of production incentives. While moving toward directly
supporting incomes can also artificially maintain resources in agriculture and result in an
inefficient allocation of resources and high costs to taxpayers, this policy has less of an impact
internationally than price supports and production incentives.
Self-sufficiency policies often have other objectives, for example assisting poor farmers
and consumers. Japan’s new Basic Law on Food, Agricultural and Rural Areas, for example,
incorporates the objectives of food self-sufficiency and raising farmers’ incomes (AJRC 2000).
However, as most farmers have relatively high incomes, much of which comes from other
activities, it seems there are other important political economy reasons behind support
policies. When policies to achieve self-sufficiency in food include other political goals, food
security can be reduced. According to Duncan (2000), major food security problems are the
result of bad policymaking or can be corrected through institutional changes.
There are also questions about the effectiveness of such an approach. Relying solely on
domestic production introduces greater risks that production will be disrupted by the
weather, as happened with Japanese rice production several years ago. In some countries,
such as Japan and Korea, food self-sufficiency is dependent on the availability of imported
energy inputs – meaning that self-sufficiency is only as secure as the supplies of these inputs.
North Korea’s recent food shortages were partly a consequence of a shortage of fertilisers.
Moreover, self-sufficiency in a particular staple food such as rice at the expense of other
commodities can lead to nutritional problems. Self-sufficiency becomes less relevant as
development progresses and consumption becomes more sophisticated, moving away from
domestic staples. Often a policy of self-sufficiency in raw commodities constrains the
development of a domestic processed foods industry because raw material costs are high and
less resources have been dedicated to this sector. While China is not self-sufficient in raw
commodities, it is in food, and is a net exporter of labour-intensive processed foods.
A self-sufficiency approach can negatively impact on equity. In most developing
countries, poor farmers tend to be taxed relative to manufacturers through industry policies
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or as a result of macroeconomic policies that lead to an overvalued exchange rate. In
industrialised countries such as Japan, urban consumers tend to pay through higher prices
for the assistance that goes to inefficient agricultural activities. Agricultural arrangements
also impact on equity in other countries as they penalise efficient agricultural exporters,
including developing countries.
Has the East Asian economic crisis made a self-sufficiency approach more attractive?
It has been claimed that the food shortages in Indonesia in 1998 following a drought and the
economic crisis proves that Indonesia, and other East Asian countries, should have been
following a food self-sufficiency policy. But the food shortages would have been more severe
if Indonesia had concentrated on producing rice rather than higher income earning exports
that it produces efficiently, such as palm oil. In key sectors such as rice, Indonesia’s
stabilisation policies and agricultural institutions had led to a situation where farmers, one
of the poorest groups in society, were being paid below world prices. There was therefore less
incentive to produce (although this was compensated to some extent by subsidised inputs such
as fertilisers and credit) and all consumers, rich or poor, were gaining from low prices.
Budgetary and other pressures brought on by the crisis led to policy changes giving farmers
close to world prices and directly targeting poor consumers with subsidised rice.
Other approaches to food security
Food security can be approached in other ways, both in conjunction with or separate from a
self-sufficiency approach. Stocks of food often form an important component of food security.
In Japan, state trading enterprises control imports of some commodities to maintain high
domestic prices. Food is stockpiled or sold, with the government taking the revenue from the
difference in international and domestic prices. In China state reserves of grain act to increase
food security. In recent years falling stocks have caused concern (see for example, Brown
1995). Falling stock levels may reflect:
• rational responses to higher prices and holding costs;
• the introduction of ‘just-in-time’ inventory practices;
• short-term weather conditions;
• improved wastage rates;
• more responsive supplies;
• better location of stocks;
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• a change in public/private and reserve/circulating stock mixes;
• an improvement in other stabilising policies; or
• a fall in protection that had been restricting efficient market processes.
These potential causes need to be canvassed to avoid low stocks being used to justify
assistance to increase production and stocks, as this would have a detrimental effect on world
prices, efficient investment and production in the longer term. The effectiveness of some large
public stockholding schemes has been questioned, as it is thought they crowd out smaller
private operators. Analysis of the equity of such schemes shows that farmers often lose from
the distortions of market quantities and prices such schemes introduce. Finally, it is
interesting to note that in other sectors, ‘just-in-time’ inventory management reflects the
willingness to trade off costs (e.g. higher risks) with benefits (e.g. lower storage costs). Such
trade-offs could apply to stockholding for food security purposes. Stockholding needs to be
fully analysed to ascertain whether it has become a more efficient and attractive option
(Anderson 1998).
Open trade and investment policies increase food security. Long-term contracts with
food exporters or direct overseas investment in food can help secure supplies through creating
market dependencies. Such approaches incorporate efficiency gains associated with speciali-
sation and trade, and therefore also boost income. As incomes rise, population drops and food
security increases. Strong trade and other economic relationships help reduce the chance of
conflict and also the need for an expensive self-sufficiency approach to food security. Food
trade has grown substantially over the years but the potential is significantly larger if trade
and investment open up further. Most of the substantial gains from trade reform go to the
most protected economies, such as Japan, which is currently facing a depressed economy and
severe budgetary problems. Some developing economies also gain from being able to export
at higher prices (DFAT/ABARE 1996).
Trade and investment policies appear to be more efficient ways of approaching food
security – but what about effectiveness and equity? Some countries such as Japan and China
worry that relying on trade exposes them to the risk of trade embargoes, which they have
experienced in the past. It is somewhat ironic, however, that limiting trade and investment
opportunities increases the effectiveness of an embargo. The risk of an embargo on food is
fairly small. Such embargoes have been used by a very small number of countries – nowadays
trade conflicts are more likely to lead to constraints on imports rather than exports, or other
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more effective forms of protest, such as the downgrading of diplomatic relations (Yang 2000).
It is difficult to make an embargo effective, as evidenced by many recent experiences.
Diversifying sources of food through a broad trade and investment approach further lessens
the likelihood of a successful embargo. Countries could choose to enjoy the benefits of open
trade and investment most of the time and self-sufficiency could remain an option that could
be drawn on if necessary, at a short-term cost. Consumption can also be changed in the event
of an embargo, for example by switching to grains and running down ‘stored grain’ livestock
numbers.
Some groups have been concerned that the poor will be made worse off if trade and
investment opens up. Food production in developing countries is usually either production of
staple foods by poor farmers or large-scale cash crop production for export. Thus any equity
aspects of trade and investment would generally concern large owners. Trade and investment
are not discriminating and if constraints to trade and investment are relied on for achieving
equity it points to shortcomings in domestic redistributive policies, which are better ways of
addressing equity.
There are also mixed approaches to improving food security. For example, rather than
using trade constraints, self-sufficiency can be advanced more efficiently through better
research and agricultural extension, better infrastructure and reforms that allow market-
driven diversification. The best approach to food security is to allow openness in consumption,
production, stockholding, trade and investment, therefore allowing comparative advantage
to apply and maximising incomes so that countries can afford to trade in food and other
products – importing what they can not produce efficiently and exporting what they produce
best.
The APEC food system
A balanced and comprehensive package of measures concerning food security was put forward
by the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) to a recent APEC meeting (PECC 1999).
The package includes measures to improve rural infrastructure; achieve technology transfer
and food safety; improve food security through the removal of export taxes, other export
constraints and export subsidies; and increase trade and investment liberalisation. Rural
infrastructure development can improve the distribution of food and related products as well
as boost incomes through encouraging the development of other rural activities, including the
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high-growth processed foods sector. The removal of export taxes is important to balance the
removal of import tariffs by food importers such as Japan and to encourage increased
production by efficient exporters. The same rationale should apply to other arrangements
that discourage exports, such as the practices of some state trading enterprises. Export
subsidies should be removed as they lower world prices and discourage efficient exporters
from producing. The trade liberalisation agenda has been broadened through this package to
cover any trade policy of concern to an APEC economy. Analysis has shown that there are large
gains to be made from trade liberalisation within APEC, as many members have complemen-
tary comparative advantages (Yang et al. 1999). Goto (1999) shows that the gains from
regionalisation are larger for agriculture than manufacturing because of the greater protec-
tion and smaller product differentiation in agriculture. With Japanese rice, however, product
differentiation is large enough to suggest that production would continue following liberali-
sation. An efficient food system better addresses food security by lowering transaction costs
and improving the ability of countries to adjust to changing situations.
Food security can be at two levels so we need to ask whether the world is producing
enough food for everyone’s needs and whether this food is readily available to all? The failure
to achieve food security for all individuals has been of concern but is really a problem of
insufficient income, not insufficient food. Food security at the individual level will be
enhanced by greater trade and investment, research and development, infrastructure,
market information, and so on, as these create higher incomes. Self-sufficiency does not
guarantee that individuals will be able to afford food. For some developing countries, food aid
is an added issue: if it crowds out the development of more sustainable domestic or traded
supplies of food then it may be causing more harm than good.
Modelling food security alternatives
A general equilibrium global trade model, the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model,
can help quantify the implications of trade liberalisation.
North America, China and Japan are examined in the model, which takes values for
some of the key variables from the associated database. These variables include imports and
exports, import tariffs and export taxes, export subsidies, taxes on factors of production, and
anti-dumping duties. Selected rice import tariffs and export taxes are shown in Table 2.4,
which illustrates that tariffs are very high in Japan, moderately high in China, and low in
North America (including those between the United States and Canada). China taxes rice
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exports to Japan and subsidises exports to North America and within China (to Hong Kong).
Japan subsidises rice exports to China and North America as does North America to Japan.
The data highlight a potential limitation with the GTAP database and model. It appears
from the GTAP database that Japan has no import tariffs on rice from regions other than
China and North America, which does not fit with Japan’s tariff schedules. This may be
because taxes are estimated not only from protection data but also from actual trade flows.
If an import tax is prohibitive and there are no trade flows, an import tax derived from (zero)
tax revenues divided by (zero) import values is indeterminate but is set to zero. Altering the
GTAP database to reflect these high taxes, for example by substituting bound rates for derived
rates, will not overcome the problem because the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
functional form used for choosing the source of imports will require massive changes in prices
to increase rice imports from a low base. Another problem could occur with export taxes. If
the database determines export taxes from the difference between export prices and domestic
prices, it will not be able to differentiate between exports of premium products and aid rice,
and between the application of an export tax and a subsidy. It has to be hoped that the flows
and taxes that are in the database are representative of what would happen in reality. This
will be more likely if the simulations are more general rather than too specific, for example
if they analyse tariff cuts and their impacts across a broad range of countries rather than for
specific countries.
Table 2.4 Import tariffs and export taxes, selected countries/regions (%) rice
Country (from/to) Japan China North America Total
Import tariffs(-)/subsidies(+)
Japan 25.0  2.6 -37.1
China -502.4 -4.4 -15.8
North America -503.1  -25.0 -4.5 -39.6
Total -503.0 33.7 -3.4 -35.2
Export taxes(+)/subsidies(-)
Japan -500.0 -502.9 -503.0
China 26.0 -100.0 -47.6 17.2
North America -9.1 0.0  -0.6  -4.7
Total -2.5 7.2  -2.5 -12.6
Source: GTAP database.
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To examine the impact of individual factors, two simple simulations were run,
presuming a one-third reduction in Japanese import tariffs and in export taxes imposed on
rice imported by Japan (the imports came from China and North America in the mid 1990s,
which was before Australian rice gained access).
With support for Japanese rice production worth US$30 billion and supported prices
five times higher than import prices, it would be expected that a one-third cut in support
would have large economic consequences unless imported rice did not substitute for Japanese
rice. However, changes to prices and welfare were small. This reflects the model’s limitations
and the limited nature of the simulations – which points to more sectors and countries needing
to be involved in liberalisation for large overall gains. Although the impacts were small, there
were a number of differences and similarities in the simulations. Despite the smaller absolute
(as distinct from relative) cutback in export taxes than in import tariffs, the fall in export taxes
leads to a larger change in world prices and a smaller rise in economic welfare. These effects
are much more marked in simulations of import tariff and export tax cuts for a large number
of countries. A cut in rice import tariffs for all countries results in a 25-fold increase in
economic welfare, compared with a lesser gain when import tariffs are cut just by Japan.
These gains would be even larger if the dynamic effects of trade and investment liberalisation
were taken into account.
Japan has suggested that trade-offs may exist between cuts in its import tariffs and cuts
in the export taxes of other countries. However, if Japan hoped that mutual liberalisation
would improve price stability and ease the adjustment of domestic industries, this is unlikely.
Both shocks imply greater access to the Japanese market and would put pressure on high-
cost domestic industries to adjust. Lower world prices, which are likely to follow a decline in
export taxes, would make this adjustment harder. Perhaps the true objective of the suggested
trade-off is one of drawing an equivalence between achieving self-sufficiency through tariffs,
and food exporters gaining food security through imposing export taxes and, possibly, export
embargoes.
Theory suggests that if Japan lowers import tariffs on rice, imports will increase
significantly, production will decrease (wheat and other grain production will increase),
consumption will rise, and there will be other changes in world supplies and prices, and so
on. The effect on supply will depend on the shocks and various elasticities – North American
and Chinese rice production and exports should increase, for example. The Japanese
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government loses revenue from import tariffs, producers lose surplus, consumers gain
surplus and there is a net gain from a reduction in the deadweight loss.
Lowering export taxes on rice from China to Japan, for example, leads to an increase
in Chinese production, a decrease in Chinese consumption, greater exports from China to
Japan, changes in world supplies, lower world prices, and so on. The Chinese government
loses export tax receipts, Chinese consumers lose surplus, producers gain surplus and there
is a small net gain from a reduction in the deadweight loss. Japanese imports increase unless
constraints increase and consumers gain from lower prices, but Japanese production falls, as
does North American production and exports.
A possible explanation for the differences in price and welfare impacts between the two
shocks is that with just a Chinese export tax cut, Japan maintains import protection and this
results in a larger impact on world prices and less change in welfare. Export taxes are often
imposed to take advantage of market power – supply is constrained to boost prices – so it is
not surprising that a reversal of this process can result in relatively high price increases. The
deterioration in Chinese terms of trade under the export tax cut provides another explanation.
More general simulations using the GTAP model have been undertaken by Yang et al.
(1999) to look at who gains and loses from unilateral and concerted trade liberalisation. They
focused on Australasia, Japan, ASEAN and North America to ask whether terms of trade
losses from broad5  unilateral liberalisation can be offset through broad concerted liberalisa-
tion. The answer depended on the size of the country, the type of protection, geography and
the composition of trade. Sensitivity to various parameters such as elasticities was also
analysed. The modelling suggested that gains will not be large when there is simultaneous
liberalisation by countries which have low trade complementarities, regardless of size. For
example, Australia is better off from concerted liberalisation with Asian developing econo-
mies than with North America. A regional trade arrangement between Japan and Korea, or
one excluding agriculture, would have far less benefits than broader arrangements. The
benefits are in the ability to specialise and trade. Unilateral liberalisation will lead to
efficiency gains and larger dynamic gains from a more competitive economy. However,
concerted liberalisation will not only address the possibly counterbalancing terms of trade
effects but also reduce resistance by lowering adjustment costs through stronger and broader
export demand. Japan heavily protects the agricultural sector with the use of high tariffs and
import quotas. As there are no export subsidies, Japan’s allocative efficiency improves
whenever trade expands as the result of liberalisation. Some of ASEAN’s large allocative
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efficiency gains are due to the increased imports of agricultural commodities and others come
from increased consumption of such goods, especially livestock products, and increased
production by food processing industries. Japan’s welfare gains would be around US$53.6
billion per annum if it undertook unilateral trade liberalisation and US$98.7 billion per
annum from concerted trade liberalisation, the majority of which comes from allocative
effects. These estimates show that gains are larger if liberalisation is broader – in terms of
countries, sectors and arrangements.
The strategy of food self-sufficiency was analysed for China by Yang and Huang (1997)
using a projections version of the GTAP model. The simulations assume China follows other
East Asian economies, contrary to the requirements for its WTO membership, and increases
agricultural protection through import tariffs to levels that will maintain 1992 levels of self-
sufficiency in staples such as rice and wheat. The economic costs would be high, especially
when economic growth is rapid. The cost to the Chinese economy would be around US$500
million per annum. These costs would be more than US$8 billion if the policy was to be
extended to other foods. The world economy also loses under this scenario. The costs to the
Chinese government would be even higher if output subsidies rather than border protection
are relied on to achieve self-sufficiency. The best way for China to increase production would
be to raise efficiency through greater investment and research.
Yang (2000) considered the medium-term impact on China of food embargoes by the
United States and its Western allies with the presumption that self-sufficiency falls in the
future as trade increases and China’s comparative advantage in agriculture lessens. The
simulations show that the embargoes would have a limited impact on food consumption but
large impacts on the economic welfare of China and the United States. A Western food
embargo against China causes economic welfare to fall by around US$8.6 billion in China and
US$3.5 billion in the United States.
Self-sufficiency, enforced or otherwise, involves large economic costs when comparative
advantage in agricultural production is lost. Article XI.2(a) of the WTO Agricultural
Agreement allows exporters to impose quantitative export restrictions so long as importers
are consulted and the WTO is notified of the nature and duration of the restrictions. More
stringent conditions could be imposed in new negotiations, for example giving the first right
of refusal to long-term customers (Anderson 2000). However, Australian agreements with
Japan in this respect do not appear to have lessened the desire for self-sufficiency, suggesting
this policy might also reflect political economy goals. Japanese policies that restrict rice
production are another reflection of this aspect.
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The political economy of agricultural policy
Approaches to food security in East Asian countries are fundamentally determined by
political economy factors, but these are difficult to quantify.
Institutions are clearly important. In Japan strong relationships exist between the
Liberal Democratic Party and farmers, powerful agricultural cooperatives and bureaucra-
cies, although consumer organisations are strengthening (Amyx 2000). China has few of these
institutions and associated relationships, and appears willing to change what institutions it
does have (e.g. by moving from institutionally set prices to prices determined within the
household responsibility system). This is because different issues dominate the political
economy of these two countries. In developing countries the most important concerns are to
achieve economic development through agricultural growth, to reduce hunger and poverty
and to enhance food security. Industrialised countries are more concerned about managing
an often stagnating sector and preserving rural incomes and communities. The need to reduce
budgetary expenditures through introducing market forces is also a goal, but this can conflict
with the other objectives.
Anderson and Hayami (1986) apply a political economy framework pioneered by
Krueger (1974) to explain the rise of agricultural protection in East Asia. As East Asian
economies have developed, both the share of agriculture in GDP and the proportion of farmers
in the population have declined. Farmers become politically stronger and active in lobbying
because collective action becomes easier and marginal returns from protection increase. At
incomes rise, consumer opposition to protection falls because the marginal cost of these
policies decreases.
While this framework can help explain how a minority group can influence agricultural
policymaking, it may not an accurate description of why agricultural protection in East Asia
was originally put in place. When agricultural protection was introduced in Japan, Korea and
Taiwan in the middle of last century, all had authoritarian governments, so the influence of
interest groups would not have been strong. The world trading system was less open than it
is today, and the supply of rice, which is the main staple food for Asian countries, was
relatively limited. These densely populated countries needed to achieve food security and
therefore at the time self-sufficiency seemed the most effective approach to achieve this goal.
The trading system has since opened up considerably, proving these short-term views wrong.
China is in a similar political situation today. It does not have a democratic political
system and key policy decisions, including those on food security, are made at the top –
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although other voices are gaining influence. The recently signed Sino-American agreement
over China’s WTO membership provides an example of how political leaders overrode the
strong opposition of the telecommunications, agricultural and financial sectors.
Another argument against a political economy explanation for East Asian policymaking
is the narrow focus of protection. If protection reflected the political weight of farmers, why
are only staple crops – mostly rice but also wheat – protected? Surely if protection was driven
by the electioneering of local officials, it would be expected that all commodities would be
protected. In Indonesia, for instance, rice is highly protected but this does not assist farmers
in the eastern parts of the country.
While this analysis strongly suggests that food security was the main reason why
protection was introduced, it does not imply that political economy issues are unimportant.
Political lobbying explains why agricultural trade liberalisation in Japan has been so difficult.
Even in China today, agricultural policy has become a critical political game and interest
groups are expected to have an increasing influence on agricultural policymaking in the
future. Demands for agricultural protection have come from a number of sources. Protection
is favoured by most agricultural scientists and economists, partly because past policies
discriminated against farmers. A more powerful force for agricultural protection is the
agricultural bureaucracy, which controls the monopolies on agricultural trade and domestic
distribution. The Ministry of Agriculture stands to gain influence and increased resources if
food self-sufficiency targets are retained. Its stance filters down to agricultural scientists and
economists who obtain much of their research and funding from the Ministry.
The lack of involvement of Chinese farmers in lobbying for protection may be explained
by the large size of the farming population and underdeveloped communication and transpor-
tation networks that hinder their organisation as a group. A more fundamental reason is that
farmers are banned from forming non-official organisations.
In Japan agricultural cooperatives and bureaucracies have a close association with the
leading party, the LDP, and have been able to influence farmers’ voting. Amyx (2000) points
out that Japanese agricultural policies have played a central role in the redistribution of
incomes across society and thus in supporting established political and social structures over
many years. However, the political economy of agricultural protection is changing. Other
bureaucracies involved in trade negotiations are pressuring for agricultural reform and the
public’s tolerance of redistribution policies is waning, with increasing realisation of the
failures and costs of agricultural policies. A new electoral system has been introduced and
may result in the erosion of the LDP’s power (although no political party yet represents non-
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farming interests, whereas the links between the LDP and farmers, cooperatives and
bureaucracies remain strong).
In China, Japan and many other East Asian countries, the two objectives of food security
and raising rural incomes have driven agricultural protection. In fact, agricultural protection
has rarely been able to achieve these objectives and may even have worked against them. All
past experiences and empirical analyses have demonstrated the immense welfare and
efficiency costs of a self-sufficiency approach, which can even increase food insecurity. China
adopted a policy of self-sufficiency during the Great Leap Forward, but could not feed its
people. At the beginning of the 1960s, the famine would have been even more severe if China
had not been able to import grain from Australia and other countries. The famine in North
Korea in the mid-1990s provides a more recent example.
Many officials and economists in East Asia have the mistaken belief that liberalisation
will create high instability in the domestic market (Huang 1998). The popular view that
protection is required to support rural incomes is also a myth, at least in East Asia. In Japan
farmers now receive at least 75 per cent of their income from non-agricultural activities
(Hayami 1988). In China this proportion is about 50 per cent on average but is much higher
for farmers in the coastal provinces (Yang and Huang 1998). Moreover, agricultural support
tends to be capitalised into land values, raising costs. Not all farmers produce protected crops
and many, in fact, suffer significant losses because food prices have risen and resources for
non-agricultural activities have fallen. In a general equilibrium analysis, Yang and Huang
(1998) find that an increase in agricultural protection in China would mainly benefit grain
farmers in the interior provinces. The impact on farmers in the western provinces is uncertain
and depends on the size of losses (from higher retail food prices) and benefits (from higher
prices for their products). Farmers in the eastern provinces would definitely lose because
agriculture only accounts for a small proportion of their income. Clearly, the situation is the
same in Japan. When Chinese and Japanese bureaucracies (and cooperatives) use farmers
as the leverage to influence policymaking, they are not representing farmers’ true interests.
Agricultural trade liberalisation is a tough policy agenda, as illustrated by the difficult
negotiations during the Uruguay Round of the GATT and the recent breakdown of talks over
the next round of agricultural trade negotiations. There are at least three strategies that can
be adopted to encourage agricultural policy reform in East Asia.
The first strategy is dialogue with East Asian governments. This will be most effective
in countries where political leaders at the top still dominate policymaking, such as in China,
but talks can give other governments leverage in persuading domestic groups to change. It
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is critical to make it clear that self-sufficiency policies usually do not achieve their objectives,
but bring heavy fiscal burdens, substantial inefficiency in resource allocation, a huge loss to
consumers and create conflicts in international economic affairs (Hayami 1988).
The second strategy is educating the public – particularly consumers and farmers –
about the costs of agricultural protection and benefits of trade liberalisation. Consumers may
not be aware of the costs of agricultural protection because the proportion of their income
spent on food has diminished as their incomes have risen. Also, many urban residents,
particularly in recently industrialised economies, still have links with rural society and
passionately support agricultural protection. It is important to make consumers aware that
agricultural protection costs more than just high food prices. In Japan recent rural infrastruc-
ture scandals involving the MAFF have come to the public’s attention. Agricultural protection
also adversely impacts on manufacturing and service industries. In addition, as the cases of
China and Japan show, many farmers do not benefit from agricultural protection and
agricultural bureaucracies or cooperatives do not represent all farmers’ interests. Farmers,
therefore, should vote according to their true interests.
Participation in multilateral trade institutions such as the WTO and APEC is the third
strategy to encourage policy reform. International trade negotiations provide governments
with important leverage to counter domestic resistance to agricultural policy reform. In an
increasingly globalised world, countries can not afford to be self-reliant. Open trade in
agriculture should be embodied in the international trading system. This is also important
for many developing economies – only with deep integration into the world market and rising
exports will developing economies increase their foreign exchange earnings and be able to
purchase food from international markets and, thus, achieve true food security.
Conclusion
In this paper, approaches to food security have been analysed, particularly comparing Japan’s
attempts to achieve food self-sufficiency with China’s more open approach to trade and
investment. Their different approaches reflect differing stages of development and different
political systems. True self-sufficiency becomes less achievable and more expensive for a
country with limited productive resources because consumption grows with development.
The paper shows that open trade and investment approaches that take advantage of
diversity and complementarity are more efficient than trying to achieve food security through
self-sufficiency, as this relies on increasing protection as development takes place (see also
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AJRC 1999). Regional cooperation to support this approach could help reduce impediments
to imports and exports and facilitate investment in food processing infrastructure and
technology, where the majority of agricultural sector growth has been. An efficient food
system can address food security through lowering transaction and adjustment costs for both
exporters and importers. Food security can be achieved efficiently, effectively and equitably
at a regional level rather than a country level, building on a variety of comparative advantages
including weather patterns and other complementarities. The PECC package includes
measures to improve production efficiency.
Over time, economies will need to substitute domestic inputs with more competitive
imports to which value can be added. China has used its comparative advantage in labour to
export processed food products. Japan could possibly use its comparative advantage to
produce more technologically advanced products.
Open trade and investment approaches, like multilateral trade rounds, offer broader
trade-offs and greater gains than a self-sufficiency approach. A regional approach to greater
food security built around cooperation and interdependence could include negotiations to
lower export taxes along with import tariffs (which would balance commitments by exporters
and importers), and could consider a broad range of products, for example processed foods
along with raw commodities. Reforms do not have to wait for the next multilateral trade
round. Reforms agreed by APEC would lead to large gains in economic welfare because of the
significant interregional trade, but these would be greater still if the European Union was also
involved – as it would be in a WTO round. Most of the gains from reform go to the reforming
economies.
Despite the clear benefits of reform of agricultural arrangements, change in Japan has
been slow, reflecting strong political economy aspects which may stand in the way of regional
negotiations. Japan and Australia have had an agreement on security of food supplies for
some time but this has done little to change Japan’s policy of food self-sufficiency. However,
adjustment costs and the political difficulties of reform will increase as more and more
assistance is required to support a food self-sufficiency approach. On the other hand, the
decline in the number of full-time farmers and the failure of the current arrangements to
attract new farmers may be positive forces for change. New technologies are driving
globalisation and the need to integrate. Japanese businesses involved in agricultural-related
industries and others that are disadvantaged in terms of higher input costs, retaliatory
protection, and so on, are becoming a strong force for change. Japan’s new Basic Law is more
WTO consistent and market aware and could provide a foundation for change. Japan now
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appears to be preparing to follow the European model of supporting farm incomes, and hence
resources in production, on multifunctionality grounds (e.g. preserving the cultural value of
the landscape) (see ABARE (1999) and Trewin (2000)). The extent of reform will depend on
the law’s interpretation and implementation. Political economy aspects will be important in
determining which approaches are chosen.
In the meantime, it is important to open up dialogue with all East Asian governments
and use public education programs and multilateral trade forums to educate about the costs
of protection and the benefits of liberalisation in order to help reform progress.
Notes
1 ‘Reasonable’ prices are relative: prices of some commodities in Japan are much higher
than world prices but incomes are larger than world averages.
2 The last few years’ fish figures from the FAO database on which this table is based
are suspiciously the same.
3 Chinese livestock statistics should be treated with caution as they often reflect
targets rather than reality.
4 The WTO rules, rights and obligations on rules and processes provided to ensure
compliance are weak in respect of state trading enterprises.
5 The simulations consider cutbacks in import tariffs, export subsidies and taxes,
production subsidies, anti-dumping duties, and so on.
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ASSESSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF JAPAN’S SPS
MEASURES
Introduction
As one of the world’s largest importers of agricultural and fisheries products (FAO 2000),
Japan wants to ensure that its people, plants and animals are protected from diseases or pests
that can be carried by imports. Restrictions on the entry of certain imports, including
complete bans in some cases, have been used to manage or control these risks. However,
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures to protect food safety and plant and animal
health can also assist domestic producers by restricting competition from imports. They can
therefore impose the same kinds of efficiency costs on the Japanese economy as tariffs and
other non-tariff measures.
The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures came into force with the
establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995.2  The Agreement provides
some – albeit inadequate – disciplines on the use of SPS measures, aiming to ensure that they
are only used legitimately where scientific evidence shows there is a need to protect health.
Japan is one of only three WTO members to have had a formal complaint upheld against it
since the SPS Agreement began in 1995.
While the SPS Agreement helps to promote transparency and ensure that policies are
based on sound scientific analysis, it does not require that a fundamental condition for sound
policy be met – namely that the policy’s benefits more than outweigh its costs. In adopting SPS
measures that meet the conditions set out in the Agreement, major food importers such as
Japan could still be imposing considerable net costs on their economies. While policymakers
may decide that such costs are justified to provide a desired level of health protection,
informed policy decisions require an economic assessment of the costs and benefits.
This paper examines the available evidence on Japan’s use of SPS measures and the
influence of the multilateral SPS Agreement on Japan. It suggests that policymakers should
move beyond the focus on purely scientific assessments to take account of the economic
implications of SPS measures. A framework for analysing costs and benefits is outlined, along
with some applications that help illustrate the types of information required. Finally, the
paper provides a checklist that policymakers, including those in Japan, could use when
assessing the economic costs and benefits of SPS measures.
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SPS measures and their use by Japan
The tariffication of non-tariff barriers during the Uruguay Round intensified concerns that
more subtle means such as SPS measures may increasingly be used to protect domestic
producers. While such measures are not classic forms of protection, as they do not openly
discriminate against imports, they can nevertheless be set or applied to favour domestic
producers relative to foreign exporters. It was mainly for this reason that the SPS Agreement
was negotiated in parallel with the Agricultural Agreement in the Uruguay Round.
Japan, a major food importer, has traditionally applied conventional import barriers to
protect domestic farmers, including high tariffs, import quotas and prohibitions, such as on
rice. While non-tariff barriers have been tariffied under the Agricultural Agreement – albeit
at very high levels – Japan has retained its extensive quarantine regulations, including
import embargoes, for health reasons. Although other trade restrictions have been lowered,
there are fears that efforts to liberalise Japanese agriculture may be frustrated if existing SPS
restrictions are made more stringent or new measures are introduced as barriers to protect
against import competition.
The difficulties in assessing the impact of SPS measures have been well documented.
But the mere existence or increased use or stringency of SPS measures in Japan or elsewhere
does not necessarily equate to increased protection, as domestic prices may be no higher than
world prices. Like any non-tariff barrier, applying the conventional price-impact method to
measure the protection provided by SPS regulations requires the estimation of the difference
between a commodity’s domestic price and its world price. While conceptually sound, these
price comparisons are time consuming and involve many difficulties, such as ensuring that
highly substitutable products are measured. Nevertheless, this method has been successfully
applied in a number of instances to quantify the protection provided by non-tariff measures,
and it remains very useful (OECD 1997). An additional complication arises with SPS
measures in that an unknown portion (and perhaps all or none) of this price wedge may be
economically justified on the basis of protecting health.
While SPS measures and protection are not necessarily correlated, determining the
frequency and product coverage of measures is a good starting point for assessing the likely
magnitude of protection. However, like many other non-tariff barriers, comprehensive and
timely data on SPS measures applied by countries, including Japan, are not readily available.
Such measures are recorded in the inventory of non-tariff barriers used by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in the Trade Analysis and Information
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System (TRAINS). Although not without deficiencies, this is the only such international
database available. SPS measures are defined by UNCTAD as ‘technical measures’ and fall
under either ‘technical regulations’ (code 8100)3  or ‘testing, inspection and quarantine
requirements’ (code 8150).4
Japan’s SPS measures, as recorded in TRAINS, are summarised in Table 3.1. However,
researchers have long been sceptical of the accuracy of the UNCTAD database, especially in
recording barriers such as SPS measures, and concerns have been expressed about its
Table 3.1 Japan’s SPS measures, 2000
SITC Products covered Measures (code) Start date Frequency (%)
00 Live poultry 116 1998 5.6
01 Chicken & other poultry meat 121 1999 20.9
02 Dairy & other animal products 28.9
Yoghurt 116 1981
butter, milk powder 116 1981
dairy spreads 108, 116 1981
other fats & oils 116 1981
eggs 108, 116 1981
03 Fish & fish products 16.3
fresh salmon, tuna & mackerel 108, 116 1981, 1992
fishpaste and flours, etc. 108, 116 1981, 1992
smoked pacific salmon 108, 116 1981, 1992
preserved salmon 108, 116 1981, 1992
dried cod etc. 108, 116 1981
crustaceans 116 1999
other 116 1981
04 Cereals & preparations 11.5
wheat & other cereals 116 1981
05 Fruit & vegetables 10.2
fruits e.g. melons 116 1981, 1999
nuts e.g. cashews 116 1999
vegetables e.g. sweet corn 116 1981
06 Sugars – lactose, syrups and molasses 116 1981, 1999 8.8
07 Coffee 116 1999 6.2
08 Cereal husks, dog food & animal feed preparations 116 1981, 1999 11.3
09 Food preparations – certain mixtures & spreads 116, 108 1981 17.3
Notes: Code 108 = Authorisation for wildlife protection; Code 116 = Product characteristic
requirements to protect human health; Code 121 = testing, inspection & quarantine
requirements.
Source: UNCTAD TRAINS database, 2000.
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declining reliability. While the database is probably sufficient to illustrate that Japan is a
significant user of such measures, with over one-third of tariff lines affected in some way by
such measures, there is no way of verifying its accuracy or comprehensiveness. According to
TRAINS, most SPS measures have existed for some time, with few new ones being recorded.
Moreover, the database suggests that Japan’s use of SPS measures has not changed, but it
is impossible to authenticate whether this is the case (Figure 3.1).
The most recent WTO Trade Policy Review of Japan (WTO 1998) identified an extensive
list of plant import prohibitions. Each of the 16 categories of plant prohibitions listed cover
several countries or regions (more than 30 in some cases) and many plants, fruits and
vegetables. For example, restrictions to prevent the entry of coddling moth – the subject of
a dispute with the United States (discussed below) – cover the following fresh fruits: apricot,
cherry, plum, pear, quince, peach, apple; and unshelled walnuts. Source countries or regions
covered include: Afghanistan, Israel, Iraq, Iran, India, Cyprus, Jordan, Syria, China, Turkey,
Pakistan, Myanmar, Lebanon, Europe, the former Soviet Union, Africa, the United States,
Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, Chile, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Australia and New
Zealand. Japan’s substantial use of such measures has been seen as a potential impediment
to agricultural trade in earlier WTO reviews.5
Thus, while the existing databases on Japan’s use of SPS measures may lack precision,
there is considerable evidence to suggest that Japan is a substantial user of these arrange-
ments.
The WTO and Japan’s SPS policies
The SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement is designed to address concerns about SPS measures being used as
disguised trade barriers. Such concerns are by no means new. Multilateral disciplines
covering SPS measures were in the original GATT articles and the 1979 Tokyo Round
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. However, these disciplines had little effectiveness
in dealing with SPS disputes. No SPS measure was successfully challenged before a GATT
dispute panel after the Tokyo Round and several prominent disagreements over SPS
measures in the 1980s are still unresolved (Roberts 1998). With the commitment to a
multilateral Agreement on Agriculture at the Uruguay Round, intended to discipline the use
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of non-tariff barriers in agricultural trade, concern heightened about the need to effectively
deal with the use of SPS measures as trade barriers.
The SPS Agreement comprises 14 articles. In essence, it recognises the right of members
to take trade-restricting measures to protect human, animal or plant health, provided those
measures are based on scientific evidence. Article 3 (on harmonisation) states that members
shall adopt international standards, if they exist, ‘unless they choose to adopt measures that
result in a higher level of health or environmental protection’. Furthermore, different
restrictions may apply to given products from different countries or regions, recognising that
risks may vary with factors such as climate and the disease or pest status of the exporting
country or region. The Agreement is therefore an exception to the fundamental most-
favoured-nation principle of the WTO, which generally prohibits this type of discrimination
in most other trade policy instruments.
The SPS Agreement enables members to choose more restrictive measures than
international norms, but it does establish a presumption of WTO consistency for measures
that do conform to international standards, guidelines and recommendations. It does not,
however, make international norms binding on members. Where discrepancies exist between
national and international measures, the onus of proof is squarely on other members, who
have to establish a case that the national regulations are inconsistent with the SPS
Figure 3.1 Frequency of use of SPS measures by Japan (per cent)
Source: UNCTAD TRAINS database.
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Agreement – that is, that they are not justified on the basis of a scientific assessment of the
risks involved. Thus, the Agreement encourages members to be fully engaged in the standard-
setting activities of relevant international bodies.6
To some extent, however, sensitive quarantine issues are increasingly occurring in
areas where no international norms yet exist and the scientific evidence is either lacking or
inconclusive. A case in point is the use of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in food.
With this in mind, the SPS Agreement allows members to provisionally adopt SPS measures
on the basis of available information, provided they seek to more objectively assess the risks
involved and to review the measures within a reasonable amount of time.
The SPS Agreement also encourages members to pursue bilateral or multilateral
agreements to recognise the equivalence of SPS measures (Article 4). This is essentially where
parties mutually recognise the equivalence of their environmental or health regulatory
regimes. However, such bilateral harmonisation carries with it the serious risk that SPS
arrangements may be used to discriminate against trade from other countries.
The transparency and dispute settlement provisions (Articles 7 and 11) aim to ensure
that members’ rights to adopt their own standards are not abused. Article 5 (assessment of
risk and determination of the appropriate level of SPS protection) explains the core role that
scientific assessment should play in determining whether measures are justified or chal-
lenges upheld.
Transparency
The transparency obligation requires members to notify changes to existing SPS measures
or the introduction of new measures that deviate from international standards and are likely
to affect international trade. This system provides a useful summary of trends in the use of
SPS measures over time and across countries. Notifications have increased significantly since
January 1995 (Table 3.2).
Japan accounts for a relatively small share of the total number of notifications. The
United States, Mexico, Australia and the European Union account for more than one-third
of all notifications over the past five years (Table 3.3).
As part of the notification process, members are required to indicate the purpose or
objective of each measure. The vast majority of Japan’s notified measures have the stated
objective of protecting public health and/or ensuring food safety. Of the 49 measures notified
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from 1995 to 1999, 37 were to ensure food safety or protect public health, while 2 were for plant
health protection and 10 for animal health protection (Table 3.4).
However, a simple count of the types of notifications does not necessarily provide a good
indication of the relative prevalence or significance of certain measures. A straight count
Table 3.2 WTO SPS notifications, 1995 to 1999.
Year Total notifications each year
1995 197
1996 242
1997 296
1998 334
1999 430
Source: WTO (SPS Committee).
Table 3.3 SPS notifications by selected economies, January 1995 to December
1999
Economy Notifications
United States 185
Mexico 150
Australia 108
European Union 74
South Korea 62
Canada 59
Japan 49
Thailand 17
Philippines 13
Singapore 7
Indonesia 6
Malaysia 6
Total WTO members 1499
Source: WTO (Document G/SPS/GEN/171).
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provides no indication of the trade restrictiveness of such measures. There are also several
weaknesses in the notification process that could potentially undermine its usefulness.
Members are only required to notify changes to existing SPS measures or the introduction of
new measures that deviate from international standards. Thus, existing measures, unless
changed, are excluded, even though they may differ from international norms and their
protective effect may have increased over time due to the relaxation of other trade barriers.
In addition, as for most WTO reporting, the process is one of self-notification. There may
also be uncertainties as to whether all members duly notify or are required to notify the
introduction of new measures for which there are no international norms. In the case of SPS
measures, members have substantial latitude in deciding what may constitute a sufficient
change that requires notification and in judging whether the new measures sufficiently
deviate from international norms. Thus, it is likely that the notification process is picking up
only a very small share of Japan’s SPS measures.
In more than two-thirds of notifications, Japan has indicated that no international
norms exist. In all remaining cases, Japan has indicated that it has adopted the international
standard. This implies that Japan has made no changes that do not conflict with international
norms (Table 3.5).
A key aspect of the SPS Agreement is to promote transparency in SPS measures, and
despite deficiencies in the notification process, the system does allow exporters to raise
concerns about notified measures before they are introduced. Each meeting of the WTO’s SPS
Committee (held three to four times a year) includes an opportunity for comments on recent
notifications. The SPS Committee also provides a forum for exporters to raise concerns about
existing measures. There have been relatively few complaints or concerns raised about
Table 3.4 Japan’s SPS notifications, by purpose, January 1995 to December 1999
Purpose Number
Public health, food safety 37
Animal health 10
Plant health 2
Source: WTO (Documents in the G/SPS/N/JPN/ series).
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Japan’s SPS measures. Minutes from SPS Committee meetings indicate that only one matter
involving measures applied by Japan has been raised over the past five years (i.e. the varietal
testing case, discussed below).
The SPS Committee has no formal system for recording how members respond to
comments on each notification - that is, whether changes are made or exporters’ concerns
adequately addressed. However, the minutes indicate that responses to complaints have
ranged from silence, to explanations, to modifications (Roberts, Orden and Josling 1999).
Dispute settlement
While the notification requirement gives members an opportunity to raise concerns about new
or altered measures, the dispute settlement provisions provide a formal mechanism for
challenging existing measures. The rules and processes for dealing with disputes, from initial
consultations through to consideration by an impartial panel of trade experts and review by
the Appellate Body, where necessary, are set out in the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
Since the adoption of the SPS Agreement in 1995, nine trade disputes alleging violations
of the Agreement have been dealt with under the formal dispute settlement process.
Negotiated settlements were reached in two of the nine cases, and formal consultations are
still pending in four cases. Consultations failed in the other three cases and the matters were
referred to WTO panels and then the Appellate Body (see Table 3.6).
Table 3.5 Japan’s SPS notifications and international standards
Year Number of Cases where no Cases where proposed
notifications  international standard measures are same as or
exists consistent with
international standards
1995 7 5 2
1996 12 6 6
1997 9 9 0
1998 11 7 4
1999 10 6 4
Total 49 33 16
Source:  WTO (Documents G/SPS/N/JPN/1-49).
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Japan has been the object of complaint in one of the nine cases to proceed to the formal dispute
resolution and appeals stages. The majority of cases have been brought by the United States,
Canada and the European Union.
The US complaint against Japan’s varietal testing requirement is one of only three to
have proceeded through the full panel and appeal stages. In each of the three cases, the panel
and the Appellate Body found that the scientific basis of the measures was faulty, and
therefore upheld the complaints.
The United States protested that Japan was prohibiting imports of all varieties of
certain agricultural products requiring quarantine treatment until the treatment had been
tested for that particular variety, even if the treatment had proved effective for other varieties
Table 3.6 Formal SPS disputes
Measure Complainant Outcome
Korean shelf-life measures United States Case settled
Korean measures for bottled Canada Case settled
water
Korean inspection of agricultural United States Pending consultations
products
US measures affecting poultry European Union Pending consultations
imports from the EU
EU measures affecting imports Canada Pending consultation
of wood from conifers
EU measures affecting asbestos Canada Panel requested
and asbestos products
EU measures affecting meat and United States and Appellate Body proceedings
meat products (hormones case) Canada completed
Australian measures affecting Canada Appellate Body proceedings
salmon imports completed
Japanese varietal testing for United States Appellate Body proceedings
agricultural products completed
Source: WTO dispute update bulletin, 1/2/00.
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of the same product. A panel established in November 1997 to consider the complaint found
that Japan had acted inconsistently with the Agreement. The Appellate Body upheld the basic
finding that Japan’s required testing for apples, cherries, walnuts and nectarines was
without scientific basis. The Dispute Settlement board (DSB) adopted the Appellate Body
report and the panel report.
Japan agreed to abolish the varietal testing requirement in accordance with the DSB’s
findings, and is consulting with the United States about a new quarantine methodology to
prevent the entry of coddling moth (WTO 2000). The case clearly illustrates the need for
measures to be based on sound scientific evidence, if they are to stand up against complaints
under the Agreement.
The roles of scientific and economic analysis
The factors that need be taken into account in assessing risk and determining the appropriate
level of SPS protection are set out in Article 5 of the SPS Agreement. Paragraph 2 of Article
5 explains that members should consider available scientific evidence; relevant processes and
production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; the prevalence of
specific diseases or pests; the existence of pest- or disease-free areas; relevant ecological and
environmental conditions; and quarantine and other treatment options.
Given the wide range of scientific evidence that can be considered in assessing risks and
designing policies, it is not surprising that assessments tend to be extremely complex and the
measures adopted difficult to challenge. SPS decision-making processes and any subsequent
challenges by trading partners can take many years to resolve (see Box 3.1).
The role of economic analysis in risk assessment and the setting of SPS standards is
clarified in Paragraph 3 of Article 5. Relevant economic factors that members should consider
include: the potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event of the entry,
establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the cost of control or eradication in the territory
of the importing member; and the relative cost effectiveness of alternative approaches to
limiting risks.
This type of economic analysis effectively takes scientific risk assessment a step
further, providing an economic or dollar value to the possible outcomes identified by the
scientists. Like the scientific analysis, the economic analysis can become very complex, and
there is often considerable uncertainty associated with many economic variables. For
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example, scientists may conclude that there is a certain probability that the introduction of
some fish disease will affect the appearance and taste of domestic fish stocks in certain ways.
How will these changes in taste and appearance affect sales of local fish? There will always
be considerable economic uncertainty as well as biological uncertainty, and many assump-
tions have to be made when assessing the effects on the domestic industry.
By setting out the grounds on which SPS measures can be challenged, the Agreement
essentially provides a framework for WTO members to use when developing their policies.
Measures will be acceptable provided it can be shown that they are based on a scientific
assessment of the risks involved. The role for economic analysis is relatively narrow. While
the economic impacts of a disease or pest outbreak on local producers are explicitly
considered, the potential costs and benefits of restrictions on trade are not. SPS regulations
are not required to satisfy the important test of most other policies – that is that the economic
benefits outweigh the costs. A policy that is scientifically sound could still impose considerable
net costs on an importing economy by limiting consumer access to imports. Ignoring these
economic impacts could result in a very misleading view of the policy’s impact.
Box 3.1 Devising, challenging and defending SPS measures – the case of
Australian salmon
The case of Australian quarantine restrictions on salmon imports, the subject of a recent WTO
dispute, illustrates the complexities and time that can be involved in developing, challenging and
defending SPS measures. Australia’s policies on salmon imports have been frequently challenged
since they were introduced in 1975. Following several years of exchanges and consultations, in
1997 the WTO established a dispute settlement panel to consider a complaint by Canada (AQIS
1999). In July 1999 Australia announced a revised set of fish import policies (AQIS 1999). The
scientific analysis that underpinned these policies had begun seven years earlier with the
commissioning of a comprehensive study of aquatic animal quarantine measures. The new
policies represented Australia’s response to the outcome of the panel and appeals process but in
February 2000 the WTO announced that some of the new measures failed to meet the require-
ments of the Agreement.
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The economics of SPS restrictions
The economic rationale for SPS measures is that the importation of a product that results in
the establishment of a disease or the introduction of a pest could impose costs on the country’s
producers, consumers or the general population. Importers may have an incentive to take
some measures to prevent disease or health problems but do not have an incentive to take into
account the wider costs that could be imposed on others. For example, importers will wish to
control the entry of diseased products if the disease would adversely affect the appearance
of the product and therefore demand for it, but are unlikely to consider the injury to other
products if the disease spreads. Private buyers and sellers of potentially damaging imports
will undertake less than the socially optimal level of SPS measures. This market failure
provides a justification for government intervention to set SPS rules.
Various instruments can be used to manage the risks of disease outbreak or the entry
of pests. The most stringent measure is a complete ban on the entry of certain imports.
Alternatives include requirements that certain treatment, inspection or certification be
undertaken before the product is admitted. Like an import ban introduced for purely
protectionist purposes, an SPS ban increases the price of similar locally produced goods,
reduces demand and increases domestic production. The SPS measures that allow imports
under restrictions result in an increase in the import prices. Therefore, like tariffs and non-
tariff barriers to trade, SPS measures affect local import-competing producers as well as
consumers. They may also affect local industries that use the restricted import and,
indirectly, other exporting industries.
If there was no risk of disease, SPS measures would result in the standard producer
gains and consumer losses of a trade restriction. Domestic suppliers of import-competing
goods gain from the effective increase in the price of the imports. Domestic consumers are
worse off, as they are deprived of access to certain imports or must pay higher prices because
of the additional costs of meeting SPS requirements. Compared with a situation of free trade,
there would be a net welfare loss to the community because the gains to producers are more
than offset by the losses to consumers.
When the risk of a disease outbreak is taken into account, the analysis becomes
considerably more complex. The standard tools for the analysis of trade barriers can still be
used, but much more information is required. Estimates of the economic impacts of a disease
outbreak on domestic production of the good in question (and other products adversely
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affected) are required, along with estimates of how the SPS measure alters the probability
of disease outbreak (recognising that SPS measures may not completely eliminate the
probability of disease, only reduce it).
A framework for analysing the costs and benefits of SPS measures
A simple trade model can be used to analyse the economic costs and benefits of SPS measures.
To simplify the analysis, initially assume:
• the restriction would involve a complete ban on certain imports;
• the removal of the ban would result in the certain outbreak of a disease or the introduction
of a pest;
• a disease or pest outbreak would result in increased domestic production costs;
• the adverse effects are limited to the product in question; and
• domestic and imported goods are close substitutes.
With the ban in place, Q0 units of the good are supplied domestically at price P0 (Figure 3.2a).
When the ban is removed, the price falls to the world price (assuming imports are perfect
substitutes for the domestic good and the importing country is small, and therefore a price
taker). Total demand rises, but the quantity supplied by domestic producers falls.
If there was no disease outbreak to consider, the consumer and producer effects would
be the same as in the standard case of the removal of an import ban. Producer surplus would
fall, but the increase in consumer surplus would more than offset this, leaving a net welfare
gain from trade, shown by the triangle ABC.
If the imports result in a disease outbreak, domestic production would be affected. Costs
would increase as productivity falls and/or costly measures are taken to deal with the disease
or pests. The costs must be offset against the gains from trade. In terms of the simple model,
the effects of disease are represented as a left shift in the domestic supply curve (Figure 3.2b).
The additional loss in producer surplus is given by the area S0CDS1. Removal of the SPS ban
would result in a net welfare loss only if the producer loss more than offset the standard
welfare gain from trade.
The lower the world price relative to the closed market price, the more likely it would
be that the trade gains of removing the ban would offset the producer losses from a disease
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Figure 3.2a SPS ban removed, no disease outbreak
Figure 3.2b SPS ban removed, disease outbreak shifts supply
outbreak, resulting in a net welfare gain. If opening the market to competition from imports
results in a substantial price fall such that domestic suppliers could not compete (that is, Pw
is below the point where S0 cuts the price axis), then there would be no additional loss from
disease and the net gain would be positive. The case of Australian bananas provides an
illustration of this (see below).
3.20
Pacific Economic Papers
Data requirements
In the simple case set out above, assessing the net economic welfare effects involves
estimating the value of two areas – the net welfare gain from trade and the producer loss from
the disease. To do this, the following information is needed (or if actual data is not available,
reasonable assumptions must be made):
• the world price of the banned good (or the price in an unrestricted market);
• the price of the domestic product in the closed market;
• the price responsiveness of both supply and demand;
• the magnitude of the increase in domestic production costs when there is a disease
outbreak; and
• the initial output level in the domestic market.
As the simple model is extended to take account of alternative real world assumptions, the
analysis will become more complex and additional data will be required.
Extending the simple model
Incorporating uncertainty about a disease outbreak
In most real-world situations, it will not be a matter of no disease when the SPS measure is
in place or certain disease without the measure. There may be some probability that a disease
would become established even with the measure in place. There may also be some probability
that with no measure there will still be no disease. To estimate the net effect of a SPS measure
it is therefore necessary to consider costs and benefits under four possible scenarios:
1. no SPS measure and a disease outbreak occurs;
2. no SPS measure and no disease outbreak;
3. SPS measure in place but a disease outbreak; and,
4. SPS measure in place and no disease outbreak.
The net benefit of the SPS measure is then the expected benefit with the measure less the
expected benefit without the measure. The expected values are found by weighting outcomes
1 to 4 by their respective probabilities (Hinchy and Fisher 1991).
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Determining the relevant probabilities is likely to involve much time and effort, and
probably disagreement among scientists. In light of these problems, it is even more important
to analyse SPS policy options in the type of economic framework outlined above. Where
scientists disagree about probabilities, it can be very useful to put an economic value on
estimates and comparisons of the effects of different assumptions. For example, say
policymakers are considering the removal of an SPS measure, but there is considerable
disagreement on the probability of this resulting in a disease outbreak. A useful question to
consider would be: how large would the probability of disease outbreak have to be to generate
costs to production that are higher than the expected benefits from giving consumers greater
access to imports? If the answer is very large (or outside the range of reasonable expectations),
then it may be decided to remove the restriction, even without reaching firm conclusions about
the probability of disease outbreak.
What if the goods are not perfect substitutes?
The analysis becomes more complex if we move beyond the simple case where the imports are
perfect substitutes for the locally produced goods. If consumers do not consider imports to be
close substitutes for the domestic good, the gains from removing the import ban and providing
competition for local producers may be relatively small. Furthermore, the domestic goods may
also be exports, so any adverse impact of a disease outbreak on export markets must be
counted as an additional cost. Australian salmon provides an example of when a disease
outbreak would affect its price premium on export markets.
Similarly, the potential economic costs of SPS restrictions are likely to be less for export-
competing as opposed to import-competing commodities, especially where the domestic
market is competitive and statutory marketing controls are weak. In these cases, the
domestic price of the export commodity will be competed down to parity with the export price,
such that the SPS restrictions will have little price impact. Moreover, the SPS measures on
such products are more likely to reflect international norms since stricter measures would
cost exporters. Thus, for SPS measures on major export commodities, the possible adverse
effects on the economy could largely be neutralised by maintaining a competitive domestic
market and removing any statutory arrangements.
What about spillovers to other industries?
Additional costs of removing an SPS ban also have to be counted if there are other industries
that might be affected. An example could be where a pest carried in one type of fruit or
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vegetable can harm the production of a range of local products. Such a situation requires that
much more information about production impacts on other industries.
Not all spillover effects from the removal of an SPS measure will necessarily be
negative. In addition to the standard welfare gains for consumers of the directly affected good,
other industries may also benefit from the removal of the import ban. Like any other trade
barrier, the SPS ban acts as a tax on exports, so there would be gains from removing it.
Partial restrictions on imports
This framework can be applied to a case where the SPS measure does not ban imports but
involves measures which add to import prices (say by requiring costly treatment or
inspection). With the restriction in place, the price of imports is above the world price, and
the consumer and producer effects are analogous to the case of a tariff.
There is one important difference, however. While a tariff generates tariff revenue from
the transfer from consumers to taxpayers, and is not counted as a welfare loss, when imports
enter with an SPS restriction, there are costs of compliance, adding to the welfare loss.
Who bears the compliance costs?
Who bears the costs of compliance (and whether costs are counted as a loss for the importer)
will depend on how the SPS measure is levied. For example, does the restriction apply to
imports from all sources or just selected countries? There are four possible scenarios (Roberts,
Josling and Orden 1999):
1. the measure is adopted by all importers and applies only to products from certain sources;
2. the measure is adopted by all importers and applies to exports from all sources;
3. the measure is adopted by just one importer and applies to exports from all sources; and
4. the measure is adopted by just one importer and applies only to exports from certain
sources.
If all importers restrict exports from a certain source, the targeted exporter must bear the
compliance cost because importers are able to buy from other sources at the world price.
However, if all exporters are affected, the compliance costs will be shared by importers and
exporters.
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If only one buyer restricts exports from all sources, that importer must bear the costs
of compliance, as exporters can readily supply at the world price to markets where there are
no restrictions. If the measure is adopted by just one importer and applies only to a certain
exporter, both can avoid compliance costs by buying from or selling to other markets, so the
measure becomes a potential rather than an actual trade barrier (Roberts, Josling and Orden
1999).
SPS measures to protect human health
The simple model can also be applied to the case where the SPS measure exists for food safety
or human health reasons. Say that the market is initially open to imports so the good is
supplied at the world price. However, consumers are concerned about the health risks
associated with the imports. In the absence of SPS measures, consumers cannot distinguish
risky goods from safe. Now assume an SPS measure is introduced which requires some
certification for risky imports. This effectively increases the price of the imports (because of
the time and cost involved in complying with the rule). As in the case of applying a tariff, the
increase in the price of the imports results in a welfare loss. However, if the SPS measure
results in greater consumer confidence, demand will increase (in terms of Figure 3.2, the
demand curve will shift to the right) and there will be a consumer gain that must be weighed
against the loss from the rise in the import price.
In many cases, determining the size of this consumer gain may be very difficult. For
example, say a measure is designed to control the use of certain additives in food, but the
effects of the additives on human health are highly uncertain and therefore so too are the
likely consumer responses to policies that control it. Even in such complicated cases, the
framework outlined above can provide some important insights. For example, a useful
question to consider would be:  how large would the consumer gains from increased food safety
have to be to more than offset the losses from reduced access to and/or higher costs of imports?
If the answer is implausibly high, it may be decided to not proceed with the food safety
measure.
Estimates of net economic effects
Some recent empirical studies have clearly illustrated that the type of framework outlined
above has practical applications and can yield important insights into the significant costs
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that SPS measures can impose on importing economies. The empirical studies also illustrate
the types of circumstances where large benefits might be expected from the removal of SPS
measures – for example where the domestic price of the restricted product is substantially
higher than the world price. In contrast, where the restricted import is not a close substitute
for the domestic product, but there is a high risk of adverse impacts of a disease on local
production, removing SPS measures could result in production losses that are greater than
any consumption gains.
A recent study of the economic implications of Australia’s quarantine ban on banana
imports illustrates the cost to consumers when imports are banned. James and Anderson
(1998) estimate the economic welfare consequences of removing Australia’s ban on banana
imports. They first estimate the production, consumption, trade and welfare effects of moving
from a ban to free trade, assuming no disease enters with the imports. The entry of imports
results in a significant fall in prices, which benefits consumers, harms local producers, but
results in a net welfare gain. When the possibility of disease is considered, there are possible
losses to producers to consider, and these could offset the welfare gain. However, in the cases
estimated by James and Anderson, the price fall is so large that the domestic industry is
unlikely to survive, even before disease is considered. If competition from imports wipes out
the domestic industry, there would be no further producer losses if a disease was introduced
(assuming the disease only affects bananas). If only producer impacts were considered, the
removal of the ban would be seen as a bad thing, generating a welfare loss. But when the
significant gains to consumers are considered, there is a net gain.
A study of the economic impacts of removing the United States’ ban on imports of
avocados from Mexico also illustrates the potential significance of gains to consumers from
access to lower-priced imports. Roberts, Josling and Orden (1999) estimate the gains from
moving from a ban to free trade or limited trade under different assumptions about the
probability and impact of a pest infestation. Even in the worst-case scenario of a certain pest
infestation and maximum damage to the domestic industry (a 60 per cent increase in marginal
costs and 20 per cent reduction in yield), moving from the ban to free trade resulted in a net
welfare gain. As in the Australian bananas case, the removal of the ban resulted in a
substantial fall in the domestic price, and the associated consumer gains more than offset the
production losses.
Consumers may consider the restricted (potentially diseased) import to be a poor
substitute for the disease-free domestic product, so reduced access to the inferior good may
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have limited effect. Although not involving empirical estimations of the costs and benefits of
restrictions, a recent study of the Australian salmon market provides a useful illustration of
a case where restricting consumer access to certain imports results in relatively small
consumer costs. The Australian Industry Commission (now the Productivity Commission)
studied the potential impacts of allowing imports of salmon from North America (assuming
no disease outbreak), concluding that the imports would be unlikely to compete directly with
Australian salmon (Industry Commission 1997). Australian salmon’s established ‘disease-
free’ status gives it a price premium in export markets over salmon from North American and
other markets where diseases are present.
Implications for Japan’s SPS policies
Incorporating economic assessments into SPS policymaking
There may be some sound reasons why SPS policymaking in most countries does not involve
explicit analysis of the economic costs and benefits associated with policy options. One reason
is that in many cases complete economic assessments are likely to be complicated and time
consuming. Scientific risk assessments, which would be the first step in a full cost–benefit
analysis, can take many years to complete and be the subject of much debate. Further time
and effort would then be required to analyse economic factors, such as how demand for
domestic products is likely to change if the products are affected by disease and how domestic
prices are likely to respond to trade liberalisation. Therefore economic analysis of this type
has been rare.
Another possible reason for the limited application of economic analysis to SPS policies
is that the WTO SPS Agreement does not require it. As noted earlier, any challenges to an
importing member’s measures must focus on scientific integrity, so it is not surprising that
detailed scientific study is at the heart of SPS policymaking in most WTO member countries.
If there was a requirement that the trade-restricting impacts of SPS measures should be
taken into account, this would be one way to encourage analysis of the full costs and benefits.
However, such a shift in focus away from pure risk assessment is likely to be difficult and
contentious. As noted by Roberts, Orden and Josling (1999), the implicit endorsement in the
Agreement of a ‘risk-related costs’ approach rather than ‘benefit–cost analysis’ probably
reflects pragmatic concerns about overly complicating the Agreement together with philo-
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sophical objections to the incorporation of economic benefits from trade when assessing SPS
policies.
The potential for a full economic analysis to become very time consuming and complex,
and the fact that it is not required by the SPS Agreement does not, however, mean that
economic analysis and some simple messages about the possible costs and benefits of SPS
measures should be ignored.
Using the framework set out in this paper, it is possible to construct a simple checklist
of factors that policymakers could consider when assessing whether the costs of a measure
are likely to be greater than the benefits. Even without a rigorous analysis of costs and
benefits, it is possible to identify situations where there may be significant net costs or
benefits. For example, if the world price is significantly below the domestic price in a
restricted market, removing the restriction may result in significant consumer gains that
more than offset the expected losses due to a disease outbreak. Conversely, if the adverse
effects of the entry of pests or disease are likely to spread widely throughout the economy,
imposing costs on producers, exporters and consumers of other goods, these costs may more
than offset the consumer benefits.
Checklist for SPS policymakers
Japanese policymakers could ask the following questions when assessing the economic costs
and benefits of SPS measures:
• Is there a domestic industry that is protected by the SPS measures?  If there is, the
characteristics of production in the industry will need to be examined closely to determine
the likely net welfare effects of restricting competition from imports. For example, is the
price of the restricted goods in the domestic market significantly higher than the world
price, or the price in unrestricted markets? If it is, there may be considerable gains from
removing the trade restriction. In some cases, such as SPS measures designed to protect
food safety or public health, there may not be a competing domestic industry being
protected by the measure. In these cases, there are no potential domestic production losses
to consider when assessing the removal of a restriction. However, the potential gains for
consumers from increased access to imports still need to be taken into account.
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• Are consumers likely to consider imports a close substitute for domestic production?  If so,
then the gains from allowing competition from imports by removing an SPS measure may
be significant. If the imports and local goods are not considered close substitutes, the SPS
measure is unlikely to be providing much protection for the local industry, so the gains
from removing the measure and allowing trade may be relatively small. However, it may
also be necessary to examine other markets where the import may compete to identify any
possible gains from trade. For example, Australia argued that imported salmon would not
be a strong competitor for Australian salmon, but that imports could compete with other
varieties of local fish (Industry Commission 1997). These effects will have to be considered
when assessing the costs and benefits of removing an SPS measure.
• Is any domestic production exported?  If so, then any adverse effects of a disease or pest
outbreak on export demand must be counted as a welfare loss. The larger the adverse
impact, the more likely that it will offset the gains from trade.
• Are spillover effects likely?  The more widely a disease or pest outbreak spreads to affect
the production of other goods, the more likely it is that there will be a net welfare loss from
removing an SPS measure.
• Do the restrictions apply to all exporters?  If so, the importer is likely to bear the costs of
compliance, unless all other importing economies also impose the restrictions. If all export
sources are covered and other importers also apply the restrictions, then the costs of
compliance will be shared, with the allocation of costs depending on the relative
bargaining strength of the importers and exporters.
• Are the restrictions prohibitive, or do some imports still enter?  The net outcome from a
partial restriction is likely to be more difficult to analyse than the net outcome from a
complete ban. In the case of a restriction that allows imports under certain conditions, it
is necessary to identify the cost impost on the imports (for example, how much prices
increase as a result of testing or certification), who bears the compliance costs (and
whether they should be counted as a loss for the importing economy), and the effect of
restricted entry on the probability of disease outbreak (the probability is likely to be more
difficult to determine than in the case of a complete ban, where it is likely to be very low).
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Conclusion
Given Japan’s heavy reliance on imports of agricultural and fisheries products, import
policies can have a significant effect on its economy. SPS policies pose a particularly difficult
challenge for policymakers. Protecting humans, plants and animals from imported diseases
and pests is an essential policy objective that generates benefits for the domestic economy.
However, policies to achieve this objective can also impose costs on domestic consumers and
Box 3.2 An example of assessing the likely economic impacts – the varietal
testing requirements
The case of Japan’s varietal testing requirements for certain fruits and nuts illustrates how
difficult and complex a full economic analysis can be. However, by asking the types of questions
listed above, even without detailed analysis it is possible to gauge whether the restrictions are
likely to impose net costs on the Japanese economy.
A major difficulty in undertaking a detailed economic assessment is the lack of disaggregated
data on the production and consumption characteristics of the fruits and nuts covered. In the
empirical studies referred to in this paper, the analysis was of two well-defined markets –
bananas and avocados – for which data were available. In the varietal testing case, several types
of fruits and nuts are covered, and analysis requires disaggregated data on the production,
consumption and price of each product, and the links between the markets.
Although detailed data are not available, it does seem that small amounts of some of the
restricted products are produced locally and therefore removing the restrictions may generate
a net gain. Giving consumers greater access to competing imports at world prices could therefore
generate net welfare gains. Japan does not seem to be an exporter of the restricted products, so
the possibility of a pest infestation imposing additional costs on exports is not relevant.
The potential compliance costs should also be a major consideration in the assessment of
the net economic impact of removing the varietal testing requirements. A wide range of
exporters seem to be covered by the requirements, and other importers do not seem to apply
equivalent restrictions (or at least they have not been challenged through the WTO as Japan
has), so if imports do enter at a higher price, reflecting the costs of treatment, it is likely that
Japanese consumers will bear the costs.
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reduce net community welfare if applied inappropriately. If the correct policies are to be
identified and adopted by governments, the trade-offs must be explicitly recognised and
analysed.
A comprehensive cost–benefit analysis, using the type of framework set out in this
paper, may be difficult and time consuming because of data limitations or scientific
uncertainties. However, even if rigorous economic analysis is not considered feasible or
warranted, a range of questions about the possible economic impacts of SPS policies should
still be asked to help ensure that the best policies are adopted.
Notes
1 Authors are on leave from the Productivity Commission. They would like to thank
Deborah Peterson for helpful comments on the paper. The views given in this paper
are not necessarily those of the Productivity Commission.
2 See the WTO’s Web page on the SPS Agreement at <http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/sps_e/ spsund.htm>.
3 Defined by UNCTAD to include ‘regulations that provide technical requirements in
order to protect human or animal life or health (sanitary regulation) or to protect
plant health (phytosanitary regulation)’.
4 Defined by UNCTAD to include ‘inspection by health authorities prior to release from
customs or a quarantine requirement covering live animals and plants’.
5 WTO Trade Policy Reviews are conducted every two years. Since the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism started in 1989, Japan has been reviewed three times – another
review is in progress.
6 These include the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the World Animal Health
Organisation and the organisations that operate within the framework of the
International Plant Protection Convention.
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CONSTRAINTS ON STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND TRADE:
THE ROLE OF LAND INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATIONS IN
EAST ASIA
Introduction1
Land rights play a fundamental role in shaping social and economic relations. The rules,
rights, duties, laws, incentives and institutions governing land markets and land use are
among society’s most powerful mechanisms for encouraging productivity, promoting growth,
stimulating investment, addressing income inequality and protecting the environment. How
well land is used and how effectively land markets operate directly influence environmental
health, public safety and economic welfare.
Policymakers in OECD countries have used a wide range of controls on land use to
promote, direct or prevent growth. Governments influence land markets and land use
through laws, regulations, administrative practices, investment, taxes, subsidies and a
variety of other policies. Urban growth management goals include constraining the intensity
of development, providing adequate public infrastructure, defining areas where development
is permitted, separating incompatible land uses, and controlling the design and capacity
standards for lots and buildings. Agricultural growth management goals include food
security, the protection of farmland from conversion and the preservation of the multifunctional
attributes of rural areas.
In the past decade, increasing attention has been paid to how land institutions,
regulations and policies can aid structural adjustment, particularly adjustment toward a
more open, market-oriented agricultural sector that is less dependent on support policies
(OECD 1998). Price supports, input subsidies, input and output restrictions and related
price-distorting policies all directly and indirectly affect agricultural land markets and
patterns of land use by increasing land values and reducing land transfers (both within
agriculture and from agricultural use to non-agricultural uses).
The nature and pattern of rural land ownership is seen as important because of the
relationship between property institutions and agricultural productivity and because of the
value economies and societies place on agriculture. New property laws and tenure reforms
reflect this importance. Governments have regulated land transfers, zoning, rental markets
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and lease arrangements, invested capital in agriculture and provided social infrastructure,
and used taxation laws to foster the rural sector. Changes to land ownership, tenure patterns
and land use regulations alter agricultural activities and production structures and directly
affect the agricultural sector’s performance.
Social, economic and property institutions vary widely both between and within
countries and therefore some researchers have warned against choosing a specific land tenure
regime or set of land institutions simply because it has worked well in some countries.
Instead, property systems should reflect the endowments and resource constraints of
individual communities (Dorner and Kanel 1971; Hayami and Ruttan 1971; Runge 1986).
The ways in which societies control land markets and uses to manage growth have
changed greatly over time. Land policy reforms have tended to be gradual and location specific
because they address problems unique to particular circumstances. Reforms of land policies
are therefore unlike other recent reviews of regulatory regimes (e.g. airlines, utilities,
copyright, food laws, visas, licensing regimes). A recent exception is the widespread and
dramatic property reforms of the ex-Soviet bloc.
This paper examines how and why governments reform land policies, focusing particu-
larly on East Asia. The role of land regulations in structural adjustment is explored and
possible reforms are examined. The paper also draws on examples from Australia, Europe and
the United States.
Why do governments regulate land markets and land use?
A competitive market has the potential to optimise social welfare. Producers and consumers
arrive at an optimal allocation of land resources when they see a prospective profit, are able
to buy land and other inputs as cheaply as possible, and can combine these inputs efficiently
to create products that have a high value relative to production costs. For land markets to
operate efficiently in a market system, property rights should be well-defined, enforced and
transferable, and should also confront users with the full social cost of their actions.
Competitive land markets require security, flexibility and certainty. Users need
protection against legal, physical and tenure uncertainties as they tend to obtain and use land
for long-term investments only if rights are reasonably secure. The system is flexible if
allocations between uses, users, regions and sectors can be changed at a low cost. In such a
system, land can be easily reallocated to higher value uses. Certainty is also necessary: rules
on land use must be easy to discover and understand.
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Completely free markets rarely exist, but when land is plentiful relative to demand,
laws governing land markets and land use tend to be simple and enforced only casually. As
land becomes scarce, elaborate institutional systems evolve. Growing populations, rapid
urbanisation, increasing incomes, technological advances and regulatory and policy-induced
incentives prompt societies to establish more formal land use systems to manage growth and
direct development.
Location determines the contribution land makes to income and welfare. Land prices
tend to decline as distance from urban centres increases, forcing land-intensive urban
activities to either move away from the centre or to substitute capital for land. The demand
for land is a function of numerous factors including opportunities for land use, income,
population and a host of policies and market influences that promote or discourage urban-
based relative to rural-based activities, and one type of urban or rural activity relative to
another.
Land is often owned and operated by a small group of people for personal gain. The
adverse effects from land use are unlikely to be considered unless there are undesirable
consequences for the owner or user; the social benefits from land use are also by-products.
Market failures partly explain this divergence between private and social welfare.
Market failures occur when the incentives available to individuals or firms encourage
behaviour that does not meet efficiency criteria. Land market failures include externalities,
public goods and asymmetric information that lessen the efficiency of land markets, push land
prices out of equilibrium and impact on equity or social and environmental policy goals.
Negative externalities from the construction of buildings, roads and public utilities in
urban areas include increased noise, inflated property values, congestion and pollution, the
loss of open space and farmland, and the destruction of historic buildings and sites. Urban
development creates profitable opportunities for some businesses but places others at risk
due to the new competition. Negative externalities from agricultural activities include:
pollution and contamination of soil, water, air and food from agrochemical use; the degrada-
tion of natural resources, particularly soil, water and rural landscapes; and the loss of
biotopes, wildlife species and habitats. Controls on land use are one method of limiting these
negative externalities (Mills 1979; Mills and Hamilton 1989; Ihlanfeldt and Boehm 1987).
As a result, all governments regulate land markets to some extent, but whether
intervention is the best way to address land use problems and whether it produces more
desirable social outcomes than an uncontrolled land market can sometimes be questioned.
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OECD policymakers and governments have tended to consider farmland the victim of
urbanisation, paying little attention to the urban and industrial policies that influence urban
growth. In addition, there has been little research on the negative effects of rural preservation
policies, for example the costs of urban housing and the social costs of excluding groups for
racial or income motivations (Fischel 1990, Nelson 1992).
Governments also use land use regulations to improve income distribution and promote
regional growth. Public parks and recreational facilities provide access to land for non-land
owners. Governments have to deal with ongoing pressures on land due to population growth
and urbanisation. While some groups demand open space and the preservation of farmland,
others want to open these same lands for development. Politically powerful groups lobby for
land regulations for monetary gain or to exclude ethnic or racial minorities from acquiring
access to their neighbourhoods (Fischel 1990; Nelson 1992). These conflicting pressures are
often concentrated at a city’s outer rings where the market is driven by capital gains,
discouraging agricultural producers from investing in long-term opportunities. If land
markets are complete, land values should be the same at the urban–rural border. However,
prices on the urban–rural fringe are influenced by speculators, who precede developers in
attempts to purchase cheap land. The supply of land is determined by the geography of the
area, by prior investments and by regulations. Regulations affect both the demand for and
supply of land by distorting prices, influencing opportunities, altering efficiency gains and
shaping technological innovation. Most policy interventions tend to raise land prices by fixing
supply.
A number of factors can prompt regulatory reforms: the existing system’s inability to
protect significant natural resources (e.g. wetlands, coastal areas, unique habitats and
environmentally sensitive areas); a wish to balance regional development; the need to link city
planning and land regulations with capital investment planning; the need for better
mechanisms to resolve interjurisdictional conflicts; the desire to improve coordination among
governmental units; the perception that the existing system is unfair, unwieldy, unpredict-
able and delay-ridden; community concerns about urban sprawl, unaffordable housing and
the loss of open space and agricultural lands; pressures caused by the mismatch between
development and infrastructure; and the need for new planning tools and techniques (APA
1998; IC 1998.)
In OECD countries over the past several decades, reforms have been motivated by
concerns over the loss of agricultural land, increased urban sprawl and environmental
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degradation. The expanding mosaic of suburban, residential and industrial development
makes farming near these developments increasingly difficult. High land prices push up
property taxes and increase the opportunity costs to farmers who are not able to earn similar
profits growing rice, tomatoes and strawberries. In addition, tensions rise between farmers
and residents over the noise, odours and air pollution caused by agricultural activities.
Barriers to changing land uses
It can be very difficult to convert land to agricultural use. Figure 4.1 (following Salazar et al.
1995) shows the implications for land use of a policy of protecting the industrial sector. Land
use is measured along the horizontal axis. VMPU represents the demand for land for urban
uses and VMPA represents the demand for land for agriculture. Point a represents the market
equilibrium with no policy distortions. OL1 land units are used in the urban sector and XL1
land units are used in the agricultural sector. The land rental is r1. When a tariff is imposed
on manufactured imports, the value of the marginal product for land in urban uses shifts out.
The new equilibrium has L1 to L2 units of land moving from agricultural to urban uses and
a new market rental value of land, r2. However, the social value of land for the urban sector
in the new equilibrium is r3. The total social cost of the tariff policy during each period is the
area abc or w.
The area w represents the social cost of the tariff policy. For t periods, at interest rate
i, the total economic loss is:
If the tariff is removed in period (t + 1), the equilibrium should return to point a, but the costs
associated with converting land from urban use back to agricultural use are so high that the
land is likely to remain in urban activities. The social cost of the tariff policy can be as high
as w/i. If the government imposes the tariff temporarily and simultaneously restricts the
conversion of agricultural land, the rental value of urban land moves to r4, the agricultural
rent remains at r1 and w is avoided as long as the tariff and the conversion restrictions remain.
There will also be additional general equilibrium effects and costs associated with the
tariff and the ‘counter’ zoning policy (for example, zoning enforcement costs may be higher
w
i
w
i
i
in
n
t t
t( )
( )
( )1
1 1
1
1
+
=
+ −
+






=
∑
4.10
Pacific Economic Papers
r2
r1
r3
r4
r2
r1
VMPU VMPA
b
w
c
a
O L1 L2 Xland
than w, capital and labour will follow land to the urban sector, land may be slow to move back
to agriculture and numerous other policies may also alter relative input and output prices).
The conversion of farmland to urban uses can be more costly to governments than had
the farms remained. For example, providing public services to housing developments can cost
more than the taxes generated by the new suburban residents. In addition, there are other
costs to society. Farming is often less detrimental to water quality than urbanisation – the
run-off from household hazardous waste such as motor oil and lawn-care chemicals can lead
to a decline in water quality. Agriculture has many benefits to society, for instance it forms
a buffer around natural areas to protect habitat and aesthetically pleasing open spaces (Kelly
and Vosick 1997).
How do governments intervene in land markets?
The public sector can ameliorate income inequalities, promote development in disadvantaged
regions, regulate private activities that harm the environment and control the undesirable
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Figure 4.1 The change in land use after tariff protection
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effects of private actions. The five most widely used policy instruments to control land
allocation and use are: property rights, land titling and registration, land use regulations,
public interventions and fiscal practices. The effectiveness of these interventions depends on
the bundle of rights associated with land use and land transfers at a local level – the rights
to sell, use, lease, mortgage, or give away or not use land.
Land use regulations refer to those government programs that explicitly manage land
uses. Public interventions include direct controls over land values; powers of prohibition and
consent; policies affecting transport, housing, health, water and sewerage; urban planning;
state-sponsored development programs; forced sales; prohibited land sales; and zoning and
related policies and programs that attempt to separate land uses to minimise nuisances and
optimise city services and infrastructure. Fiscal practices include land, inheritance and
capital gains taxes, related financial incentives and controls on capital markets.
Zoning is a major way of controlling land use in many OECD countries, including
Australia, Japan, Korea and the United States. Certain activities are designated to particular
areas, and zoning boards decide which category an activity belongs to. Zoning may include a
legal map showing existing and proposed subdivisions, with controls on subdividing and
developing a tract of undeveloped land; building and housing codes that regulate the
construction, maintenance and use of structures; architectural controls that regulate
structure or design for aesthetic purposes; and zoning restrictions that prevent development
on agricultural land.
Policymakers use these various tools individually and in combination to provide
appropriate incentives for the location of businesses and residences, to conserve historic and
cultural sites, to protect farmland from conversion and to promote the production of specific
agricultural activities. The aim is to encourage the best use of transport networks, public
services and farmland, and to regulate the pace, location and characteristics of development.
In theory, land policies can be used to offset inefficient development patterns, to take account
of the nature of nuisances created by different land uses, to inform buyers and sellers of the
public’s interest in the environment, to provide the optimal level of public goods and to reduce
the costs of providing public services.
Countries regulate land ownership transfers to encourage qualified farmers (Denmark,
Germany and Japan); to avoid excessive aggregation of land (Denmark, Germany, New
Zealand and Switzerland); and to avoid land subdivision (Australia, Denmark, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland) (OECD 1998).
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Unlike in Japan and many European countries, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and
the United States generally do not intervene to encourage the consolidation of parcels that
are deemed too small or the redistribution of those that are too large. Instead, the mechanisms
used to control urban growth and protect farmland tend to be based on economic incentives
rather than direct control of rights and permission. Examples include property tax relief and
agricultural districting that taxes land on its agricultural value as opposed to its development
value.
In general, the Australian and American regulatory approaches can be characterised
as a process of national selection, involving local initiatives and a capacity for experimenta-
tion. Most land use policies are locally developed and then exchanged, strengthened or
rejected until the successful ones gain national recognition (Alterman 1997). In contrast,
Korea, Japan and many European countries have a hierarchical approach to land use
regulations and reform. Local governments initiate reforms, but approval and implementa-
tion are dependent on the national government.
The United States has been innovative in its protection of agricultural land. ‘Right to
farm’ laws exist in all states, providing farmers with immunity against legal action from
suburban neighbours. Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) programs allow developers to
purchase development rights from farmers in agricultural zones (sending areas) provided
they increase the density of residential development in development zones (receiving areas).
Sending areas are usually farmland or areas with sensitive environmental attributes,
historical significance, or some other valuable asset that would be harmed or degraded if
development was to intensify. Receiving areas are locations identified by the community for
future growth, possibly due to the availability of public services and transportation. Most
TDR schemes allow landowners to decide whether to develop their land or sell their
development rights and then protect their property against any future development.
Developers must own the development rights before they can build in the receiving areas.
TDRs achieve goals on land use without the use of public funding for local acquisition and
allow property owners protecting public goods to be paid for saving and maintaining areas
with special attributes.
Since the late 1980s, the emphasis of land use goals in the European Union has shifted
from protecting agricultural lands for food security purposes to protecting the environmental
value of agricultural land and preserving the countryside for its own sake (Alterman 1997).
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In practice, however, urban planning policies often dominate, with the protection of the
countryside being a by-product.
Australian rural land management policies overwhelmingly focus on environmental
and sustainable development goals, although they are also driven by urban sprawl, which has
resulted in the loss of farmland. In some communities, concerns over sustainable develop-
ment and environmental degradation arise when farm households expand into less fertile and
more ecologically fragile areas after selling their farms to housing developments. More
commonly, however, it has been disputes between new and existing rural land uses that have
driven the regulation of agriculture.
The spread of residential housing and commercial land uses onto what was previously
agricultural land reflects the increasing demand for land for urban use. Some agricultural
producers and advocacy groups do want to ensure a plentiful supply of rural land for
agriculture, but many landowners stand to gain from subdividing their land for urban
development. Australia’s current approach to deregulation and economic efficiency encour-
ages the transfer of land to higher valued uses. Broader questions are being raised, however,
about the way other government policies such as the tax treatment of hobby farms, the
provision of infrastructure and the potential misuse of zoning regulations result in sub-
optimal social outcomes.
As in the United States, zoning is used widely in Australia to separate incompatible land
uses, delineate urban boundaries and establish conservation areas. A 1998 Industry Commis-
sion study concluded that zoning is likely to continue to be the main policy to control land use.
The study recommended that local governments use infrastructure provision in conjunction
with zoning to assist in the efficient transition of rural land to urban and peri-urban use (IC
1998). The study suggested that zones be established for different land uses (e.g. rural, rural-
residential) focusing less on size restrictions and more on ensuring the cost-effectiveness of
infrastructure (e.g. roads, water and sewerage). Developers might be required to build roads
in less densely settled areas and provide a more complete set of services including roads,
water and sewerage in densely settled areas. The aim is to avoid existing households having
to subsidise new households. The report recommended that wherever possible, costs should
be met by residents on a user-pays basis to ensure full cost recovery.
Australian has also set minimum subdivision sizes to keep allotments large enough to
make agricultural production viable. Where there are residential development pressures on
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areas subject to minimum sizes, rural residents buy large lots even though they do not intend
to use them for agriculture (McKenzie 1997; IC 1998). In New South Wales, the state has
imposed a minimum lot size of 40 hectares. However, many local governments have approved
subdivisions of less than 40 hectares (IC 1998). The state of Queensland forces developers to
demonstrate an overriding need for the development in terms of the benefit to the community
before ‘good quality’ agricultural land may be converted.
Australia does have a comprehensive regulatory review process aimed at evaluating all
existing regulations and any planned regulations. Regulations are supported only where a
well-defined social or economic problem exists, where other solutions such as market
mechanisms or self-regulation are inappropriate, and where expected benefits exceed likely
costs. The guidelines do not prescribe what type of regulation should be used in a particular
circumstance but set out principles and analytical requirements to be followed in developing
regulations (ORR 1998).
Land reforms in East Asia
Land reforms in Japan, Korea and Taiwan followed a similar pattern, partly because of
similarities in their agricultural sectors. In all three countries, land reforms were successful
in stimulating agricultural output, enhancing productivity, reducing poverty and promoting
equitable growth.
Japan’s land reforms started in 1946 with the government purchase of all tenanted land
in excess of one cho (0.99 ha) for resale to tenants or others (King 1977). In the three-year
period from 1946 to 1949, two million hectares of cultivated land was purchased from 1.8
million landowners – representing one-third of the country’s total cultivated area (Ohto 1990).
The beneficiaries were 4.3 million tenants. New regulations ended the payment of rent in kind
and set maximum sums for rents (Ohto 1992). Another 1.25 million ha of uncultivated land,
half of which was privately owned, was sold to farmers and settlers.
The reforms had a major impact on agricultural performance, income distribution,
poverty reduction and the contribution of the agricultural sector to industrialisation. The
purchasing power of millions of small farmers was increased, providing a large market for
emerging manufacturing industries. During the second half of the 19th century, agricultural
land taxes made up approximately 80 per cent of national tax revenue – most of which was
used for financing industrialisation. Prior to the reforms, landlords had tended to invest their
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incomes in urban activities, industrialisation or banks, rather reinvesting in farming. After
the reforms, the outflow of capital from agriculture to other sectors decreased dramatically
– from more than 20 per cent in the mid 1930s to 3.5 per cent in 1952 (Ohto 1992).
The number of farms run by owner-cultivators increased from 31 per cent in 1946 to 62
per cent by 1950. Over the same period, part-tenant/part-owner-cultivators fell from 20 per
cent to 7 per cent and tenants fell from 28 per cent to 5 per cent. Over the next two decades,
agricultural output grew by around 4 per cent a year, with labour productivity increasing by
4.8 per cent (Berry 1984). By the 1960s, however, the widening gap in labour productivity
between agriculture and manufacturing meant farm incomes were falling behind urban
incomes. The extremely small size of agricultural holdings hampered government efforts to
increase labour productivity. Price-support policies were introduced and over time these have
placed an increasing financial burden on Japan, encouraged strong political lobby groups and
attracted increasing criticism from the world’s leading agricultural exporters.
Agricultural production in Korea rose rapidly after the 1945–52 land reforms redistrib-
uted land from landlords to owner-operators and practically eliminated tenancy. Agricultural
output grew by between 3 per cent and 4.5 per cent during the 1950s and 1960s. A ceiling was
set on farm size, decreasing the proportion of farms of more than 3 hectares from about a
quarter in 1945 to only 5 per cent after the reforms. By the early 1960s, output per hectare
was some 40 per cent higher on farms of less than 0.5 hectares compared with farms of more
than 2 hectares (Berry 1984).
Taiwan’s land reforms included rent reduction, land transfers from landlords to tenants
and the confiscation and sale of land formerly owned by expelled Japanese. Similar to the
experiences of its two East Asian neighbours, Taiwan’s land reforms boosted agricultural
performance, with substantially higher yields and net farm incomes twice as high on farms
of less than 0.5 hectares than on those of more than 2 hectares (Berry 1984).
East Asia’s enormous success in agriculturally led industrialisation, together with high
urbanisation rates, extremely low ratios of arable land per person and concerns over food
security have all contributed to agricultural protection policies. Land regulations have been
part of this protection. Over the past decade, a variety of issues relating to land have been
identified as inhibiting efficient resource allocation, constraining structural adjustment and
imposing high and often unnecessary costs on consumers, producers and trading partners
(ABARE 1989; OECD 1998).
In Japan these issues include:
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a) the high proportion of agricultural land in urban areas, which places upward pressure on
housing costs and urban developments, reduces urban investment, raises the costs of
public works and reduces purchasing power;
b) a property tax system that favours agricultural land, thereby distorting land use;
c) a capital gains tax on land that discourages sales;
d) an inheritance tax on land that encourages fragmentation of farmland;
e) an agricultural support and subsidy regime that has created politically influential interest
groups;
f) direct prohibitions on converting farmland to other uses;
g) despite government efforts to promote farmland ‘mobilisation’, farmland owners tend not
to rent or lease land in anticipation of opportunities for capital gains (inhibiting
consolidation of land and reducing economies of scale); and
h) farmland rent is determined by administration not by the market (only 13 per cent of
farmland in Japan was rented in the mid 1990s).
Farmers complain that regulations aimed at controlling farmland rights are time consuming,
expensive and cumbersome. For example, before purchasing or renting farmland in Japan,
authorisation must be applied for and, in principle, this may be granted only when all of the
following conditions are met (OECD 1998):
a) the individual will cultivate all of the farmland;
b) the individual or at least one family member will regularly farm the land;
c) the total area of farmland after the acquisition or lease must be 0.5 hectares (2 hectares
in Hokkaido) or more except for some types of intensive farming; and
d) the individual must be considered capable of farming effectively on the land, in light of
their financial situation and the location of their residence.
A second example relates to tax concessions. Agricultural land in Japan is either exempt from
or provided concessions on land-value tax, land-holding tax, fixed-asset tax, inheritance tax,
acquisition tax and capital gains tax. Table 4.1 presents land value estimates for the mid
1990s by the National Chamber of Agriculture in Japan. A 1 hectare paddy field was valued
at ¥20 million if in an agricultural area, at ¥161 million if in a rural–urban district and at
¥531 million if in an urban area (the national average), but at ¥3113 million if it was converted
to urban use. The National Chamber of Agriculture calculated that the real value of farmland
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in agricultural areas is some six times higher than the theoretical productive price of ¥3.6
million per hectare (calculated as the three-year average net return divided by the interest
rate).
In the mid-1990s, the government removed or reduced various land tax exemptions on
two-thirds of the agricultural land located within the Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya metropolitan
districts. After a transitional period, owners will pay the urban rates for fixed-asset, land-
value and inheritance taxes.
Korea’s urban land management regime has distorted land markets in ways that result
in excessively high land, housing and building costs; expensive residential and commercial
space; the degradation of environmentally fragile land; the loss of cultural resources, open
space and prime agricultural land; and excessive urban sprawl (Green, Malpezzi and Vandell
1994; Lluch 1995; Son 1994; Lee 1994).
What are the costs and benefits of land regulations?
Urbanisation creates growth and aids structural transformation. Urban development will be
affected by the cost and availability of labour, land and infrastructure (electricity, freight,
public transport, water, sanitation and telecommunications).
Firms are attracted to urban areas because of the benefits of sharing resources with
other firms and being able to access to input and output markets, knowledge, skilled labour
and services. Total factor productivity tends to be higher in cities because agglomeration
economies are greater, at least until congestion and rising land and labour prices take over
Table 4.1 Farmland prices: 1 hectare paddy field in Japan in the mid-1990s
Type of land Price per hectare, million ¥
Market price urban zone 531
Market price converted to housing use in urban zone 3,113
Market price peripheral zone 161
Market price agricultural zone 20
Productive price (rice production; net land return/i) 3.6
Inheritance tax price (agricultural investment price) 9.5
Source: National Chamber of Agriculture, ‘Farmland price survey’, cited in OECD 1998.
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(Mills 1998). The additional capital involved in production boosts the productivity of urban
workers – a reason why incomes improve when rural workers migrate to cities (Mills and
Becker 1986; Mazumdar 1987; Mills 1998). Urban areas attract and retain educated workers
and are able to match up skills and job requirements. However, these effects can be
constrained greatly by inefficient housing and urban transport policies, and by constraints on
labour mobility such as poor information flows, high search costs and residential segregation
(Keare 1999).
Traditional manufacturing industries are sensitive to rising costs and tend to relocate
to the outskirts of large metropolitan areas or to small and medium-sized cities. Less labour-
intensive industries and services usually remain as they depend on information and
technology resources and a well-educated workforce (Henderson 1997).
Globalisation is rapidly changing urban development. The worldwide trends that affect
the economic growth of metropolitan areas include the growing importance of international
trade and investment, the increasing global mobility of factors of production, the growing
importance of knowledge industries, the critical role of market size, the need to adopt ‘agile’
business practices and the necessity of forging international strategic alliances (United
Nations 1995). Globalisation requires a investment, business and living climate that supports
and attracts internationally competitive firms and industries (Rondinelli and Vastag 1997).
Regulatory reforms that improve urban land management can therefore result in large
dynamic benefits to the economy. Even only a modest improvement in land, housing and
commercial buildings and assets can increase GDP by more than new annual investment.
Most cost–benefit studies of urban land use regulations have tended to analyse one or
a few regulations in isolation (Bertaud and Malpezzi 1994). Examples include the net
economic impact of zoning (Pogodzinske and Sass 1991), the costs and benefits of density and
subdivision regulations (Real Estate Research Corporation 1974), rent controls and related
price controls (Malpezzi 1993) and building codes (Muth and Wetzler 1976). However, urban
land markets are influenced by a range of rules, policies and institutions.
Regulations and government policies change the equilibrium price of land. Land prices
perform two roles. First, land rents and increases in land values produce returns to land
owners. Second, land prices indicate the value of land to producers and signal how land should
be used. High land prices signal that the land should be developed intensively or be occupied
by an activity that highly values the site. In residential use, for example, high land values
encourage dense residential development.
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Agricultural support will change agricultural land values by increasing the returns to
factors of production (with most benefits tending to go to factors with low elasticities of
supply). Numerous empirical studies have assessed how agricultural support raises land
prices (Alston 1986; Chavas and Shumway 1982; Burt 1986; Phipps 1984; Clark et al. 1993;
Runge and Halbach 1990). Some research has suggested the impact of government support
policies is only 15 to 20 per cent of capitalised land values and that inflation, price
expectations and the cost of capital are more important factors. However, no research argues
that support policies do not contribute to inflated land values.
Land use regulations can artificially restrict land supply and building designs to such
a degree that the rise in land and housing costs may far outweigh the intended benefits. Once
housing prices begin to rise, governments often intervene to control prices or subsidise
disadvantaged groups in ways that may further dampen incentives to supply housing, further
exacerbating problems.
In addition, land use policies impact on a wide range of economic activities and their
success depends on macroeconomic, trade, banking, finance and investment policies, to name
a few. Land use policies tend to bias economic growth toward urbanisation and away from
rural-based activities, and provide biased investment returns in favour of land at the expense
of other socially productive assets. Proper cost–benefit analysis of policy reforms is complex
and difficult in this setting. The net impact of the entire set of policies is invariably different
from the economic results obtained from the cost–benefit analysis of a single land use policy.
It is also important to analyse the physical development of urban areas and to understand how
the residential, commercial and physical infrastructure is distributed within the area, and
how this distribution changes over time. In most countries, urban industrial employment
exhibits strong patterns of decentralisation (K.S. Lee and Choe 1989). In some cities,
employment decentralization seems to be driven mainly by market forces, but in others, such
as Seoul, government policies also encourage it (K.S. Lee 1989). In addition, cost–benefit
studies need to analyse how urbanisation impacts on land used for recreation and housing and
on commercial and industrial property prices and rental fees. The costs and benefits need to
be measured from the point of view of the economy as a whole as well as for different groups,
including land owners, building suppliers, housing landlords and owners of commercial
buildings, and for national and local government revenues.
The many variables that need to be considered in the analysis of costs and benefits
include delays imposed by regulatory procedures, which tie up capital and increase risk;
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controls on prices; taxes (acquisition taxes, property taxes, income taxes, capital gains taxes
etc); financial taxes and subsidies; infrastructure pricing and subsidy policies; effects on
consumer demand for land and housing; and locational effects.
A second set of prices needs to be used to derive the net benefits of open space and the
net costs of pollution and congestion. For example, property owners within restricted
development zones and Korea’s greenbelts bear the cost of land use restrictions, while the
larger community receives the benefits of open space. However, without the land use
restrictions, property owners would maximise their own incomes and the market would fail
to provide the ‘optimum quantity’ of open space. Even if the optimum quantity and location
of open space is able to be identified, the market fails to provide for non-rival and non-
exclusive goods such as open space. Thus, a fundamental role for cost–benefit studies is to
understand how regulatory reforms can price benefits such as greenbelts and provide
compensatory payments to those forgoing development gains.
With overwhelming evidence that the costs of land regulation in Japan and Korea are
excessively high, the most important use for cost–benefit analysis is likely to be measuring
the benefits of deregulation and alternative options to help form new land use rules.
Policymakers could use the information to anticipate how consumers and producers of land
(including land owners, contractors, building suppliers, home owners, renters, landlords,
users of parks and open space, etc) might react to a new regulation. The analysis should help
policymakers assess the various components of a proposal, including what each component
is expected to do and how the components relate to each another, and determine whether the
proposal will achieve the desired outcomes (Macdonald and Crutchfield 1997).
In Japan and Korea, like in other countries, a more efficient land use management
regime will require a flexible mix of policies, rules and institutions that increase net welfare,
including the quality of the urban environment. In responding to an OECD regulatory reform
survey in 1999, the Korean government identified land regulations as one of four key areas
for reform.
Much of the literature suggests that to prevent land policy inducing further urban
problems, policymakers in Japan and Korea need to exert a different type of influence over
land use and land development. The greatest gains appear to be from not unnecessarily
constraining the supply of land for housing or discouraging the private sector from providing
affordable housing in appropriate and safe locations.
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Conclusion
Economic growth, urban development, environmental protection, increasing equity and
preserving the benefits that farming provides are all important goals. Balancing these often-
conflicting objectives requires a land management strategy that facilitates land market
operations and protects sensitive land and cultural resources. Such a strategy will need a mix
of policies (including regulatory and economic policies), clear property rights, good infrastruc-
ture, and information and education to help land managers avoid land degradation problems.
Well-functioning land markets and land use activities can be recognised by the ease of entry
and transactions. Secure, long-term rights for land tenure and land transfer should be in place
and must be maintained by relevant laws, policies and institutions. Transaction costs should
be low, adequate information should be provided, land market support mechanisms must be
competitive, and there needs to be clear, simple and enforceable legal rules for transferring
land rights (Hanstad 1998).
The process of reforming land use policies will depend on economic, social, historical and
policy features that are unique to a particular setting. Regulatory reform of land use should
eliminate obstructing and costly rules and promote regulations that focus on the protection
of public health, public safety and the environment.
Note
1 Thanks are due to Jeff Bennet and Ray Trewin for helpful comments and suggestions.
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PROBLEMS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN’S FARMLAND
REGULATIONS AND TAXATION
Introduction
Japanese agriculture is highly inefficient. Although Japan’s protection of agriculture is the
highest in the world (Honma and Hayami 1991; Yoshioka 1996, p. 16), it has been the only
industrialised country to have decreased its food-sufficiency ratio in the postwar period
(Yoshioka 1988, p. 45). Agricultural value added in real terms has been falling since 1970
(Yamada 1991)1  and the sector’s net contribution to national income is now negative,
reflecting the government’s excessive intervention in agricultural production and marketing
(Hayami and Godo 1997).
The small scale of Japanese farming is behind the poor performance of the agricultural
sector.2  The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries estimates that a profitable farm
size is around 10 to 20 hectares (MAFF 1992), but nearly 80 per cent of farms are smaller than
3 hectares.3  Despite MAFF’s assertions that the consolidation of farmland has been its top
objective since the Agricultural Basic Law was passed in 1961, small-scale farming has
persisted.
Farmland problems are so complicated and sensitive that researchers as well as
farmers have tended to avoid discussing them (Godo 1996, 1998). Agricultural economists in
Japan had not been able to provide a clear-cut explanation for the persistence of small-scale
farming until Godo and Hayami pointed the blame at regulations on farmland use and low
taxes on farming (Hayami and Godo 1994; Godo 1996, 1998).
This short paper explains, for the first time in English, Godo and Hayami’s assertion
that these factors have encouraged farmers to hold onto land in the expectation of large capital
gains when it is sold for development.
Barriers to farmland conversion
Japan is highly populated and therefore conflicts often arise as to whether the limited
flatlands should be used for agricultural or non-agricultural purposes. On the surface,
Japan’s farmland zoning system aims to prevent piecemeal development, but in practice
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regulations are often put aside, for instance when a public works plan emerges. It is an open
secret that development plans are located according to the ability of politicians to induce them
to their constituencies. If the conversion of farmland is involved, the high price offered by
developers gives farmers huge capital gains. These profits are so attractive that farmers tend
to hold on to land even it is losing money. The low taxes on farmland further encourage this
tendency. In addition, because strict rights protect tenants, Japanese farmers are reluctant
to lease land to larger, more efficient operations. Families who have farmed in the same place
for generations make up one of the most influential groups in Japanese politics. Farmers’
solidarity has been critical in gaining favourable farmland regulations and attracting
development plans. Newcomers are discouraged because they pose a threat to this solidarity,
and this is another factor that prevents free and open competition in the farmland market.
The enlargement of farm size may be MAFF’s top objective but the small scale of farming
provides a justification for its existence and its large budget allocation in a time of government
cutbacks.
Regulations on farmland use
Regulations on converting farmland to non-agricultural use are very complicated as separate
permission needs to be obtained under various laws: the Agricultural Land Law and the Law
Concerning Construction of Agricultural Promotion Areas being the most important.4
Under the Law Concerning Construction of Agricultural Promotion Areas, municipal
governments are obliged to define Exclusively Agricultural Areas (EAAs) in their jurisdic-
tions (currently, nearly 80 per cent of farmland is designated as EAA). These lands are
prohibited from conversion to non-agricultural use and MAFF gives priority to producers in
these areas when allocating subsidies. Officially, municipal governments are only supposed
to revise the designation of an EAA if there is a significant change in the economic (or social)
environment. In other words, farmers or developers who want to build on EEA farmland must
wait till the municipal government changes the area’s status.
For farmland not in an EEA, the conditions for conversion are outlined in the
Agricultural Land Law. The village’s Agricultural Commission, whose members are elected
by farmers,5  decides whether a conversion plan submitted by a farmer or a developer satisfies
the law. If the plan passes the assessment, the local governor or office of the MAFF gives it
a permit.
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Officially, land conversion laws are very strict, but in reality they are interpreted very
broadly. Municipal governments often revise EAA status when presented with a farmland
conversion plan by farmers and developers. The Agricultural Commission’s examination of
farmland conversion plans also tends to reflect the interests of farmers rather than the public.
When farmland is converted to non-agricultural use, the price is between 30 and 140
times higher than its earning capacity under agricultural use (Figure 1). Even when used for
farming, its saleable value is between 3 and 80 times higher than its current earning capacity.
This reflects expectations of capital gains: the value is too high if agricultural production is
the sole motivation of farmers.
Farmland taxation
The burden of land tax in Japan (as measured by the ratio of tax to the market value of land)
is low compared with other industrialised countries (Boone 1990, p. 17), but the assessment
methodology is complex.6  This is particularly the case for farmland taxes. Various kinds of
tax are levied on farmland, with the major three being property tax, inheritance tax and
transfer income tax.7
Property tax is levied annually on the assessment value of land at 1.4 per cent. But
farmland is assessed differently, based on the earning capacity for agricultural use and not
reflecting the value of the surrounding non-farmland.8  This value is much lower than the
trade price, as shown in Figure 1, meaning the property tax burden on farmers is negligible.9
When farmland is transferred after an inheritance or bequest, the inheritance tax that
will apply will depend on the degree of urbanisation of the surrounding area. But, in most
cases, especially with farmland in EAAs, the assessment value of farmland is so low that
inheritance taxes are virtually nil.10  Even for non-EEA farmland, thanks to special tax
provisions, farmers can effectively postpone the legal obligation to pay inheritance tax
indefinitely.
When the sale of farmland involves a capital gain, a 30 per cent transfer income tax
applies after a basic deduction of 15 million yen is subtracted from the profit. Transfer income
tax is therefore progressive. However, a further deduction applies if the farmland is sold for
public works, meaning that selling to the government is the most favourable way to maximise
the capital gain.
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Notes: a Prices are the average of all the prefectures excluding Hokkaido as of 1996. 
b While the prices in the original data sources are per tan (991.7 m2) or per tsubo (3.3 m2), which
are conventional Japanese units of measurement, they have been converted into million yen per
hectare for the convenience of readers.
c Earning capacity is calculated as the present value of the average rental charge per hectare of
farmland (with an annual discount rate of 4.1 per cent).
d,e Based on City Planning Law, urban areas that include cities with populations of over 100,000
are divided into Urbanisation Promotion Areas and Urbanisation Control Areas. An Urbanisation
Promotion Area is defined as ‘an area that is already urbanised and is a planned and prioritized
area that should be further developed within ten years’. An Urbanization Control Area is ‘an
area whose urbanization should be controlled’. General development, such as residential and
commercial development, is restricted in Urbanisation Control Areas (for details, see City
Bureau, Ministry of Construction 1996).
Sources: MAFF; National Federation of Agricultural Commission; Godo 1998.
Figure 5.1 Comparison of trade prices of paddy fielda
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The inseparability of tenancy and ownership
Even if loss-making farmers are holding on to land with expectations of capital gains in the
future, they could still make money by leasing their farmland to more efficient farmers,
allowing large-scale farming to emerge. Tenancy rights are heavily protected under the
Agricultural Land Law and the Land Lease Act, which were established after the war to
prevent the revival of the exploitation of tenant farmers. Because it is difficult to cancel
tenancy contracts without paying a lot of compensation, in effect making tenancy inseparable
5.9
No. 305 July 2000
from ownership, landlords have been reluctant to lease their properties and tenant farming
has not occurred on a large scale.11
Under the 1975 Agricultural Land Use Promotion Project, MAFF introduced tenancy
contracts that allow landlords to evade the stipulations of the Agricultural Land Law if
permission is granted by the Agricultural Committee. This was a makeshift measure to
mitigate the rampant underground leasing of farmland, and the overprotective rules of the
Agricultural Land Law still exist. In close rural communities, even after the introduction of
the new contracts, landlords often feel under strong pressure to compensate tenants if
contracts are cancelled.
Political dynamics underlying farmland problems
Throughout the postwar era, farmers have been a strong political lobby group. As in Korea
and Taiwan, farmers have tended to live in the same place for generations and are a tight-
knit group. The number of registered voters per member of the House of Representatives is
small in rural areas and large in urban areas, giving farmers greater political weight and
making it difficult for not only for ruling party but also for the opposition to oppose farmers’
interests.
Farmers have benefited from agricultural price support policies that have resulted in
domestic prices that are many times higher than world prices. The most typical (and
notorious) case is rice, which has been highly supported through heavy regulations and huge
fiscal expenditures on production and marketing. However, as off-farm income has increased,
farmers have been less concerned about the price they can obtain for their products.12
Accordingly, Japan has been resorting more and more to public works to gain the votes of
farmers. Public works are the best opportunity for farmers to maximise capital gains from the
sale of farmland and for politicians to display their allegiance to farmers by bringing these
works to their constituencies. For most farmers, preserving the chance of farmland conver-
sion is more important than improving the profitability of agricultural production. In order
to avoid missing opportunities for farmland conversion, farmers give top priority to maintain-
ing close relations with similar small farmers and resisting the entry of outsiders. Newcomers
need the Agricultural Commission’s approval to purchase or lease farmland in the village
(Article 3 of the Agricultural Land Law) and the Commission has tended to block potential
new entrants. This is another factor that distorts the market for farmland and reduces the
efficiency of farming.
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Figure 5.2 shows how the method of protecting farmers has gradually shifted from price
support to public works. Nearly 0.5 per cent of farmland is converted to non-agricultural use
each year and the capital gain from farmland conversion is almost equivalent to four-fifths
of the total value of agricultural production (Godo 1996).
MAFF has repeatedly said that enlarging the size of farms is its top priority, but it has
done little to foster large-scale farming because this would mean the loss of a large number
of farmers, the deterioration of farmers’ political power, and little need for MAFF’s
extravagant agricultural policies (and employment and budget). Although the lack of
transparency and consistency in farmland regulations have been major obstacles to the
consolidation of farming, MAFF has done little about these problems. Instead, it has raised
farmers’ expectations of capital gains by relaxing restrictions on farmland conversion on the
pretext of deregulation. Raising the tax burden on farmland would help promote large-scale
farming, but this has been politically impossible because the government does not want to
hurt traditional farmers.
Farmland policy reform
Researchers have debated whether farmland regulations are necessary and some believe that
the zoning system should be abandoned. The reasons for this belief differ – while some deny
that farming produces externalities and call for the conversion of all farmland (for example,
Hasegawa 1994), others wish to preserve the positive benefits of farming but suggest a
Pigovian tax/subsidy system should replace the zoning system.
The overwhelming majority of Japanese researchers and the general public support the
preservation of farmland, especially paddyfields, because of its many benefits, particularly
in preserving the environment (such as preventing floods and soil erosion). It is unlikely that
zoning regulations would be replaced with a Pigovian tax/subsidy system because the
difference between the social value and the private value of farmland would need to be
assessed parcel by parcel, which is unfeasible.
A number of reforms are desperately needed. Most importantly, the zoning system
needs to be stricter and clearer in defining which land is to be protected exclusively for
agricultural use. Japan’s citizens need to work with the municipal governments to agree
which farmland should be protected and which should not. In the past, the public has tended
to leave land use planning to the municipal governments and only criticise or resist plans if
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they infringe on their own interests.13  The success of a new zoning system will depend on
changing the public’s attitude to planning, as well as ending the abuse of farmers’ political
power.
The farmland tax system also needs to be thoroughly reformed. While the zoning system
needs to allow for farmland conversion if changes in social or economic situations occur,
farmers should not expect windfall benefits. The capital gains tax therefore needs to be much
higher. In addition, taxes on the ownership and inheritance of farmland should be raised to
induce inefficient small farmers to sell or lease land to more efficient and innovative farmers.
Farmland that is not protected should be taxed according to its non-agricultural value to
induce the conversion to non-agricultural use. This would be equitable as farm households
tend to be wealthier than urban households. A unified and systematic methodology needs to
be set up for assessing farmland values.
The Agricultural Land Law should no longer be used to regulate the entry of new
farmers and the role of the Agricultural Commission in screening newcomers should be
removed. The need for farmers to collaborate on issues such as water use and preventing
Figure 5.2 Fiscal expenditure on rice support policies compared with capital
gains from farmland conversion
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries; Godo (1998, 2000).
Fiscal expenditure for rice price support policies
(percentage to the total value of rice production)
Capital gain caused by farmland
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blight and other plant diseases does not rationalise the entrance barriers imposed by the
Agricultural Commission. Entry liberalisation is compatible with collaborative farming, as
farmers could draw up explicit and open-minded contracts about the use of common
resources. In addition, the Agricultural Land Law’s overprotection of tenancy rights should
be abolished in order to activate farmland leasing.
Because farmland problems are so complicated and politically sensitive, any attempts
at reform will encounter a lot of political backlash. Although in the past, Japanese citizens
have tended only to raise problems that personally affect them, it is important that they take
part in shaping new farmland policies. These problems are too challenging to solve in a short
time, but Japan will need to face up to them if the inefficiency and stagnation of Japanese
agriculture is to be resolved.
Notes
1 Yamada (1991) estimates the average annual compound rates of total production and
net value added in Japanese agriculture after 1970 have been -0.5 and 0.8 per cent,
respectively.
2 MAFF (1992) estimates agricultural production costs could be cut in half if farming
was done efficiently, on a large-scale.
3 This figure does not include Hokkaido island and is taken from 1995 Agricultural
Census.
4 The City Bureau of the Ministry of Construction (1996) describes Japan’s land use
regulations.
5 Although the Agricultural Commission does include members who are not farmers,
their role is not influential.
6 See, for example, Nomura Research Institute (1991) for details.
7 For details of all land taxes, see Ishi (1993).
8 In Urbanisation Promotion Areas, a portion of farmland is assessed as residential.
9 The tax office does not publish the assessment value of farmland. According to a
survey conducted by the National Federation of Agricultural Commissions, the
average assessment value is around 1 million yen per hectare. This means an average
farmer (who owns 1.5 hectares of farmland) pays less than 20,000 yen (approximately
A$300) in property tax.
10 Because of the unclearness and ambiguousness of the assessment methodology, the
inheritance tax will not be known unless the inheritance occurs. Yet, the Central
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Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (1996) provides some evidence as to the lightness
of the inheritance tax burden on farmland.
11 Neither the Agricultural Land Law nor the Land Lease Act obligates landlords to pay
compensation when cancelling a tenancy contract, but compensation has become a
judicial precedent.
12 Agricultural income now accounts for only 20 per cent of the total income of an
average farm household.
13 Iwata et al. (1992) also severely criticize ordinary Japanese citizens for their
reluctance to participate in city planning.
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